

LONDON GENERAL AGENCY SERVICES

15, Gt. JAMES ST., LONDON W.C.1.

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

AND HER RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS



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CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

AND HER RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS

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April—July, 1938

Editorial

SINCE the last issue of CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA in December, 1937, a number of events have occurred which may have a decisive influence upon the East European situation: (1) the trial of twenty-one men in Moscow, including such prominent revolutionaries as Bukharin, the Marxian theorist, whose head Lenin said was "stuffed with books"; Yagoda, the former pharmacist and head of the G.P.U.; Rykov, former Chairman of the Council of Commissars; Grinko, former Commissar of Finance; Rakovsky, former Ambassador to Great Britain; and Rosengolz, former Commissar of Trade *; (2) the annexation of Austria by Germany; (3) the insistence by Poland that Lithuania should resume normal relations with her; and (4) Stalin's re-statement of his policy.

* All the accused, with the exception of three, were sentenced to be shot, and it was announced in Moscow that they were executed on March 15. Sentences of long terms of imprisonment were imposed upon Rakovsky and two others.

We need not dwell here upon the strangeness of the circumstance that each of the accused in the Moscow trial, following the practice firmly established among accused in the Soviet Union, confessed to the crimes with which he was charged. The subject is one that requires treatment at length, and we shall publish an article on it in a future issue. It is sufficient to quote here the statement made by Mr. Charles Rappaport, a prominent revolutionary, who has just resigned from the French Communist Party on the ground that it was allowed no initiative of its own, and was compelled to follow orders received from Moscow.† This statement is of exceptional value because it is based upon inside knowledge and personal experience. Mr. Rappaport wrote :

“The confessions can only be accounted for by the moral torture to which the accused must have been subjected, the fears which they felt for the safety of their relatives and friends, and the hopes which they entertained that their lives might be spared, thus allowing them to continue their revolutionary work. The Russian revolutionary is courageous and uncompromising when he is opposing Tsarism or Capitalism. But if he is called upon to face ex-comrades behind whom are the masses, his attitude at once changes. He is then ready to surrender everything, even honour itself. His inflexibility and self-assurance vanish, and he becomes weak and demoralised. At the XV Congress, when Trotsky, Kamenev and Rakovsky were excluded from the Communist Party, I personally urged Kamenev, who was my friend, and who was later shot, to comply with all the formalities required of him and carry out the ritual of confession. If only he would do so, I said to him, he would save his life, and be able to continue his revolutionary work. This conversation between us took place in the Kremlin. Now I feel profoundly sorry that I gave him advice which was as immoral as it was useless.”

† *Why I Left The Communist Party*, by Charles Rappaport; POSLEDNIYA NOVOSTI (Paris), March 29, 1938.

No one reading the published accounts can fail to notice that the trial was conducted in such a manner as to demonstrate to the world that the accused had been willing tools of foreign powers in a conspiracy to bring about the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. Germany, said Rykov and Bukharin, demanded that in return for her support "the national republics shall be allowed the right of free separation." The accused admitted that from the beginning they had acted in close co-operation with national movements in the Soviet Union; one of them, Grinko, a Ukrainian, even declared that, along with others, he had entered the Communist Party, concealing the fact that he was a member of a Ukrainian national organisation. He became Commissar of Finance and, in this high office, together with other prominent Ukrainians in the Soviet service, worked for the independence of Ukraine.

With the exception of White Russia, it was not clear what was to happen to the national republics after they had seceded from the Soviet Union; but the impression is left upon the mind of anyone reading the evidence that it was intended that the Ukraine should become a protectorate of Germany. As for White Russia, an arrangement had been reached with Germany that she should pass to the tutelage of Poland. Nor was Great Britain forgotten. She was to be placated with the gift of a protectorate over Uzbekistan. Finally, the Maritime Province was to be handed over to Japan. France and Czecho-Slovakia were the innocents of the piece. They wanted nothing. Germany demanded that the Soviet Union's pact with them be broken; but although "Karakhan gave an affirmative reply, we considered that we could fool her by not complying with

this demand," said Bukharin. A group of military leaders, headed by Marshal Tukhachevsky, who, together with seven Generals, was tried in secret and shot not long ago, had agreed to participate in the conspiracy. But they were also to be "fooled." Tukhachevsky and his nearest associates were to proceed to the Kremlin and kill Stalin and other Soviet leaders. They also undertook deliberately to open the frontiers to the German Army. But Bukharin disclosed to the Court that the political plotters feared that Tukhachevsky might effect a Bonapartist *coup* which would be disastrous for them. After allowing the German Army to enter Soviet territory, he and others associated with him were to be arrested, blamed for the defeat of the Soviet forces defending the frontier, and put on trial for high treason. Meanwhile, the politicians were to spread patriotic slogans, and win popular support for themselves.

It would appear that if the Soviet Government wished to paint a picture of the situation in Eastern Europe that would fire the patriotism of their supporters and create mischief abroad, they could not have done better than extract from the accused the statements which formed the evidence given at the trial and reproduce them for all the world to read. But the flaw in the procedure is the fact that the whole of the evidence was based upon the admission of the accused that strong national movements existed in the Soviet Union. It is true that one of the chief objects of the trial was to discredit these movements by calling them "Fascist," and associating them with foreign Powers. Yet the existence of vigorous national movements could not be

concealed; it was indeed the very basis of the prosecution.

Thus, unwittingly, it was made manifest to all the world that the U.S.S.R. was a ramshackle structure, a colossus on clay legs in the real meaning of the phrase. According to the accused themselves, Germany demanded no more than the national republics desired and the Constitution itself allowed: exercise of the constitutional right of secession.

* * * * *

Germany's annexation of Austria brings not merely the Czecho-Slovakian but also the Ukrainian question to the forefront. As the crow flies, the distance from the frontier of the Soviet Ukraine to that of Czecho-Slovakia is a little over one hundred miles. Asked recently how, seeing that Polish and Rumanian territories intervened, the Soviet Union could go to the aid of Czecho-Slovakia, Litvinov replied by quoting the proverb: "Where there is a will there is a way." It should be borne in mind that in the event of such aid being given, the Red forces would have to be based on Soviet Ukraine, and cross either Polish or Rumanian territory, both of which are thickly populated with Ukrainians, entering Czecho-Slovakia at the Podkarpatskaya region, which is Ukrainian.

* * * * *

At this moment Stalin has thought fit to re-state his fundamental policy.* His previous declaration of fundamental policy was made as far back as 1925.† He then

* *Pravda*, 14th February, 1938.

† The Policy of Stalin, by L. A.; *Contemporary Russia*, October, 1936.

asserted that Socialism could be established in a single country, provided that it was under the rule of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but he added, "such a country must organise armed forces which will be able to march forward to the help of the proletariat in other countries." In the period that has elapsed since Stalin spoke, Germany, Italy and Japan have formed a *bloc* against Communism. Stalin now says that a victory for Socialism has been achieved in the Soviet Union but it is not final; the danger of intervention remains and can only be averted by

"combining the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people. The international proletarian ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in bourgeois countries must be increased and strengthened; the political assistance of the working class in the bourgeois countries for the working class of our country must be organised in the event of a military attack on our country; and also every assistance of the working class of our country for the working class in bourgeois countries must be organised; our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, and the Chemical and Air Defence Society must be increased and strengthened to the utmost. The whole of our people must be kept in a state of mobilisation and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no 'accident' and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take us by surprise."

Stalin does not speak, as he did in 1925, of the need for the Red Army "to be prepared to march forward to the help of the proletariat in other countries." Anxious now to secure the assistance of the democratic Powers, he is more careful in the language which he uses, and, when in difficulties, follows Lenin's advice: "to tack, wait and retreat."

Stalin's words mean that the Soviet Union must strive to bring over to its side, the proletariat of bourgeois countries—of Fascist countries, so as to weaken their defensive capacity against Communism; of Democratic countries, so as to compel their governments to align themselves with, and thus defend, the Soviet Union.

Stalin's policy, then, is still the policy of World Revolution. He believes that the Soviet Union, which he calls the citadel of World Revolution, is in great peril from the Fascist nations, and he strives to defeat them by promoting underground revolutionary activity within their borders and by playing upon the fears of the democratic nations with a view to enlisting their armed support. He hopes to make use of the democratic nations to conquer the Fascist nations and to profit by the resultant chaos to bring about World Revolution.*

Leaders of the revolting Nationalities in the Soviet Union say : Leaving moral considerations altogether out

* A fortnight later the Soviet press "explained" Stalin's statement. It said that the enemies of the Soviet Union were Fascist countries and that the Soviet Union and the *Comintern* were loyally co-operating with all other countries against Fascism. It added that a great war was inevitable in which one or other side would be destroyed.

The policy of the *Comintern* was described by its General Secretary, Mr. Georgi Dimitrov, at the Seventh World Congress of the *Comintern* in 1935. He made it clear that while Communism should unite with the democracies against Fascism, Communists should utilise the occasion for training the masses for revolution, and for preparing the way for the seizure of power and the setting up of a Soviet government everywhere. (*International Press Correspondence*, August 10, 1935; No. 37; pp. 973 and 976).

of the question, it is for these democratic nations to decide whether it is practicable for them to take the side of a Red Empire, the component republics of which are striving with all their strength to win their independence from Muscovite tyranny. We do not believe that in the twentieth century England will repeat the error of which she was guilty in the nineteenth century and lend her power to the thankless task of attempting to keep a very sick man alive.

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British Trade with the Soviet Union

By LANCELOT LAWTON

I

Great hopes were placed upon the Commercial Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union four years ago. It was widely believed that it would lead to a marked increase in the export of British-made goods. Has this belief been justified by experience? The following article provides an answer to this question.

ON February 16, 1934, a Temporary Commercial Agreement was concluded between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This agreement replaced that signed on April 16, 1930.

The agreement of 1930 was denounced because it did not secure the United Kingdom a fair exchange of trade. In each year while it lasted Soviet exports to exceeded Soviet imports from the United Kingdom. Even over a much longer period the same characteristic had persisted. In no one year since 1921 was the trade balance favourable to the United Kingdom.

The new agreement sought to remove this disadvantage to the United Kingdom. In Article 3 the Soviet Union expressed itself as being "desirous of applying in an increased proportion the proceeds of the sale in the United Kingdom of goods imported from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to payments for goods purchased in the United Kingdom and for the utilisation of British shipping services." Continuing, the Soviet Government declared its willingness to give effect "to

the arrangements with regard to an approximate balance of payments set out in the Schedule to the present agreement.”

Article 3 meant that the Soviet Government would expend to an increasing extent the proceeds realised from the sale of Russian goods to the United Kingdom on purchasing goods in the United Kingdom and utilising British shipping services. To ensure that this purpose was achieved it was laid down that each year, from the year ending December 31, 1934, to the year ending December 31, 1937, the payments of the Soviet Union in the United Kingdom should bear to the proceeds of the Soviet Union in the United Kingdom a defined proportion or ratio; and that after December 31, 1937, an approximate balance of payments measured by the ratio 1 : 1.1 should be maintained. It was further provided that the proceeds of the Soviet Union in any year should be the value of its imports of merchandise as recorded in the trade accounts of the United Kingdom, and that the payments of the Soviet Union in any year should be the sum of the following accounts :—

1. The value of the exports of United Kingdom produce and manufactures and of imported merchandise recorded in that year in the Trade Accounts of the United Kingdom, subject to the deduction of the value of goods exported or re-exported in that year from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union for which payment is not made in the year in which the export or re-export takes place.

2. The amount of credits repaid by the Soviet Union in that year (excluding interest) in respect of exports or re-exports of the United Kingdom in previous years.

3. The amounts paid in that year in respect of the chartering of British ships.

4. An amount equal to $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the sum of the imports of the United Kingdom from the Soviet Union and the exports and re-exports of the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union in that year to represent the excess of all pay-

ments of the Soviet Union not otherwise specifically provided for over similar payments to the United Kingdom.

The largest items in the balance of payments are the proceeds of the Soviet Union, consisting of the value of the imports of the United Kingdom from the Soviet Union, and the payments made by the Soviet Union for exports of the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union. We will deal with these two main items first.

The new agreement gave rise to high hopes. It was realised that inasmuch as foreign trade was a state monopoly in the Soviet Union, it was within the power of the Government to increase its purchases from this country, and bring to an end a condition in which trade balances were persistently adverse to the United Kingdom.

The following figures show the value of the trade of the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union from 1932 to 1937 :—

	*Imports from the Soviet Union	Domestic exports to the Soviet Union	Re-exports to the Soviet Union	Domestic exports and Re-exports
	£	£	£	£
1932 ...	19,645,130	9,222,885	1,397,402	10,620,287
1933 ...	17,491,099	3,341,414	957,356	4,298,770
1934 ...	17,326,619	3,640,469	3,905,431	7,545,900
1935 ...	21,763,984	3,482,510	6,243,547	9,726,057
1936 ...	18,903,385	3,507,300	9,838,441	13,345,741
1937 ...	29,096,536	3,083,023	16,432,557	19,515,580

* Not including bullion and specie.

† In 1882, according to Mulhall's Dictionary of Statistics, the value of Russia's imports to the United Kingdom was £21.1 millions, and of the United Kingdom's exports to Russia £5.8 millions. Thus, the total value of the trade between the two countries in that year was £26.9 millions.

It is of interest to compare the mutual trade of the two countries for 1932 and 1937. The year 1932 is selected as the base year in preference to 1933, the year preceding that in which the trade agreement was concluded, because 1933 was an abnormal year: the Soviet Union then encountered

the full effects not merely of the world depression, but of economic chaos at home; in addition, commerce between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union was hampered by the embargo placed upon it by the United Kingdom as a consequence of the issue of the trial of British Engineers in Moscow.

The figures cited above and below, except where otherwise stated, are taken from *The Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom*. In this publication imports to, and exports from, the United Kingdom are shown in the following classes:—

1. Food, drink and tobacco.
2. Raw materials and articles mainly unmanufactured.
3. Articles wholly or mainly manufactured.

IMPORTS FROM SOVIET RUSSIA

For some years Great Britain has been the largest purchaser of Soviet goods. In 1932 she took 23.8 per cent. of the imports of the Soviet Union to foreign countries, and in 1936 26.6 per cent., or in this last year more than one quarter of the whole.

In 1937 the value of the imports from the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom was £9½ millions greater than in 1932. Of that value more than half was accounted for by raw materials and articles mainly unmanufactured; in 1932 the value of imports under this heading was also half that of the total imports.

Raw materials and articles mainly unmanufactured have always occupied the chief place in our imports from the Soviet Union; the commodities under this heading consist almost wholly of wood and timber and undressed hides and skins; in 1937 their value amounted to £13½ millions out of £15 millions, which was the total value of imported goods in this class; in 1932 the corresponding figures were much the same.

The following table shows that there was a marked increase of both Russian and Canadian imports of soft sawn wood into

this country from 1932 to 1937, and that Canada has benefited appreciably from the Ottawa preference :—

		1932	1937
Soviet Union	...	£4,527,935	£7,314,836
Canada	£945,776	£5,633,931

It is quite evident that the not disinterested assertions made in 1932 that Canadian wood would not find much favour in the British market, was not true, and that providing it is properly graded and efficiently distributed, there is room for it as well as for Soviet wood. Whereas in 1932 Canadian wood of all kinds formed 4 per cent., by 1934 it reached 14 per cent. of the total imports of wood to this country.

Next to raw materials, foodstuffs comprise the largest class of Soviet imports to the United Kingdom. In 1932 they accounted for about one-third, and in 1937 for more than one-quarter of them.

A conspicuous feature of the returns for 1937 is the large amount of wheat imported: 8,130,138 cwts. In 1936 the imports of wheat from the Soviet Union to this country amounted to only 167,307 cwts. In that year it was officially stated that the harvest was abundant, but later it was officially disclosed that it was poor. In 1932 the imports of wheat from the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom amounted to 3,274,000 cwts., in 1933 to 5,769,887. Both these years were years of famine.

As the Soviet Union no longer urgently requires foreign currency, in years of bad harvest it has no need to sell large quantities of grain abroad, thus depriving the population of essential food. But it is apparent that when harvests are average in size, it will export to the United Kingdom and other countries considerable quantities of grain.

The third class of imports from the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom consists of articles wholly or mainly manufactured. In 1937 they amounted to a value of about £5 millions, of which nearly £1 million was represented by motor

spirit. They constituted less than one-fifth of the total imports; in 1932 the proportion was much the same.

When the period of the first Five-Year Plan came to an end in 1932, many English writers and politicians expressed alarm because they believed that the world's markets would be flooded with low-priced manufactured goods from Soviet Russia; time has proved that there was no justification for their apprehension. Production of manufactured goods in the Soviet Union is still far from adequate for the needs of the home market.

UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS TO SOVIET RUSSIA

In 1932 the value of the produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom exported to the Soviet Union amounted to £9,222,885; in 1933 this value fell to £3,341,000. Thenceforth, until 1936, it remained approximately near to this sum, dwindling in 1937 to the low level of £3,083,023.

In exports the largest class consists of articles wholly or mainly manufactured; in 1932 the British export to the Soviet Union of articles of this class amounted to £8,753,507, in 1937 only to £2,347,984.

The following table shows the values of the chief articles exported in each of these years :—

	1932	1937
	£	£
Iron and steel and manufactures thereof	1,387,813	407,271
Machinery	6,201,051	820,821
Nickel, unwrought ...	204,639	582,500
Tin	133,635	372,747
Wool, raw and waste, and woollen rags ...	61,304	410,110

It will be observed that with the exception of the first two items, the "produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom" (a somewhat elastic term) exported to the Soviet Union in 1937 were not of such a character as to call for the employment of a large amount of British labour.

UNITED KINGDOM RE-EXPORTS TO SOVIET RUSSIA

When we turn to re-exports we touch what might be called the black spot of Anglo-Soviet trade. The following table shows the values of the chief re-exports from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union in 1932 and 1937 :—

	1932	1937
	£	£
Tea	237,680	540,049
Rubber	678,323	2,680,930
Non-ferrous Metals ...	338,224	11,297,115

As a result of re-export, gain accrues to this country from profit made by brokers, insurance agents and shipping firms. Such profit, it has been estimated, amounts to not more than 5 to 10 per cent. of the total proceeds. In addition, it is sometimes argued that British trade benefits inasmuch as producers of the commodities sent here for re-export are enabled with the money realised to purchase British manufactured goods. But not always does it work out this way ; producers may purchase goods other than British and more likely than not they will do so if they live in countries outside the British Empire. But whatever may be said for re-exports, it cannot be denied that they afford a very small profit to a nation compared to that which it derives from exporting its own merchandise.

The outstanding feature of the trade between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in the five years under review has been the rise of the proportion of re-exports to exports as a whole from 13 per cent. to 84 per cent. As the following figures show, this rise has been progressive :—

1932	13 per cent.
1934	52 „ „
1935	64 „ „
1936	73 „ „
1937	84 „ „

The excessive proportions of re-exports, and even the character of a considerable part of the exports proper from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union, show clearly that trade with Russia has so far not conferred on British labour the large benefits which were anticipated in many quarters.

In 1932 domestic exports amounted to £9,222,885, re-exports to £1,397,402. In the beginning of 1934 the Commercial Agreement was signed, in which the Soviet Union agreed to the desirability of increasing its purchases of British-made goods. Yet from that moment, domestic exports decreased while re-exports increased out of all proportion until in 1937 their value exceeded those of 1932 by seventeen times. When the Commercial Agreement was concluded its fulfilment in this manner was certainly never contemplated.

THE £10 MILLIONS CREDIT

The question of credits has constantly been to the fore in connection with Anglo-Russian trade. But not until 1936 was an agreement arrived at; the circumstances that led up to it were briefly as follows :—

The foreign trade indebtedness of the Soviet Union had been lowered from 1,200 million dollars in 1931 to 75 million dollars in 1933. The large accumulation of debt represented by the first figure was the consequence of the enormous importation of goods rendered necessary by the first Five-Year Plan, which actually was a Four-Year Plan, covering the period from October 1, 1928, to December 31, 1932. During this time the needs of the Soviet Union for foreign goods greatly diminished and imports were reduced in the period of the second Five-Year Plan, which lasted from 1933 to 1937.

While foreign indebtedness, and with it necessity for foreign commodities, had markedly decreased, the reserve of gold and foreign currency had considerably increased. Externally, the Soviet Government was in a strong financial position, and for a while, when making purchases in this country, preferred to pay cash rather than submit to unfavourable credit terms. Yet, while boasting of its capacity and proclaiming its resolve

to continue this method of payment, the Soviet Government was not anxious to part with ready money longer than was necessary. For above all it wished to preserve and increase its reserve of gold and foreign currency as against the contingency of war. At that time, Mr. A. P. Rosengoltz, then Commissar of Trade, declared that the Soviet Union would be willing to accept credits but only on the following conditions :—

That such credits could be utilised for obtaining new technical inventions, that their duration should be longer than five years, and the interest payable for them less than 6 per cent.

On July 28, 1936, an agreement was concluded between the Export Credits Guarantee Department, acting on behalf of the Board of Trade, and the Trade Representative of the Soviet Union in the United Kingdom, by which a financial credit of £10 millions, bearing interest at $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., was placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union. The condition was made "that the goods purchased shall be wholly or mainly manufactured articles."

In an exchange of letters with the Export Credits Guarantee Department, Mr. A. V. Ozersky, who was at that time Trade Representative of the Soviet Union in the United Kingdom, declared : "I understand from discussions which have led to this agreement that the sole purpose of the British Government in making it was to facilitate increased purchasing in the United Kingdom by Soviet import organisation of goods wholly or mainly manufactured in the United Kingdom." In a further statement he said : "There is every reason to expect that both sides will carry out this agreement not only in the letter but also in accordance with its spirit."

In an interview given in *Pravda*, Mr. A. P. Rosengoltz, Commissar for Foreign Trade, said : "From the English side we sometimes hear the wish expressed that within the framework of our total imports from the United Kingdom the share of goods of United Kingdom origin should be increased. I suggest that the conclusion of the present credit agreement based on the purchase of United Kingdom goods meets this wish."

All the orders under the agreement were placed before the stipulated date, September 30, 1937, with the exception of a few, in regard to which negotiations were still proceeding, and were concluded in the first half of October, the Export Credits Department having meanwhile agreed to a prolongation of the expiry date.

In 1937 the United Kingdom benefited little from these credits; indeed, the value of its exports to the Soviet Union of wholly or mainly manufactured articles then amounted to only a little more than one-quarter of that of the exports of the same class in 1932.

In the course of a statement made at the January meeting of the Executive Council of the Russo-British Chamber of Trade, Mr. N. A. Bogomolov, Trade Representative of the Soviet Union in the United Kingdom, said that of the goods ordered under the credit agreement a certain proportion had been delivered in 1937 but the bulk would be delivered in 1938 and 1939. He added that the advantages derived from the agreement were obvious, "that not only did it increase the volume of orders for United Kingdom goods in 1937, but it made British machinery even better known in the Soviet Union. Many types formerly imported from other countries were ordered for the first time in the United Kingdom and it is to be anticipated that good results are likely to ensue from the fact that hundreds of Soviet engineers and heads of State organisations were brought into direct contact with leading representatives of British firms."

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

It was said at the beginning of this article that the Temporary Commercial Agreement signed in February, 1934, provided that the payments of the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom should bear certain fixed ratios to its proceeds in the United Kingdom up to December 31, 1937, and that thereafter an approximate balance of payments should be maintained, measured by the ratio 1 : 1.1.

According to official figures from the three years of the operation of the Agreement, *i.e.*, from 1934 to 1936, the payments of the Soviet Union exceeded the amounts stipulated for the period by £12,823,000.

It should be added that of the £8 millions which represented the excess payments for the first two years, 1934-1935, a large proportion, if not indeed the whole, was represented by the liquidation of matured credits, and mainly because of it the figures looked so well. While under the agreement it was permissible to include repaid credits in the balance of payments, it is regrettable that payment for the exports of British-made goods were not larger.

If the composition of the excess payments was not all that could be desired, still more open to criticism was the manner in which the prescribed ratios of payments to proceeds were achieved. Of the payments by the Soviet Union the bulk consisted of those for re-exports; in other words, the defined balance of payments was realised not, as had been hoped, because domestic exports increased—they actually shrank considerably—but because re-exports increased enormously. If it were possible to extract the sum actually accruing to the United Kingdom from its re-exports to the Soviet Union and substitute it for that which is set down in the balance of payments, and which represents the whole value of re-exports, regardless of the fact that little of it accrues to the United Kingdom, then it would be found that the Soviet Union had far from achieved the defined ratios of payments to proceeds. It fulfilled the letter of the Agreement, but flagrantly offended against the spirit of it.

When the document was signed, Lt.-Col. Colville, M.P., Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, said: "I would add, if I may, that, in agreeing to the balance of payments arrangement, the Soviet Government have adopted a very wise and far-sighted course. They have seen that the real security for trade is a good understanding between the two countries, and in order to secure that understanding they

have agreed to an arrangement which is novel. There will be critics of this arrangement. There always are critics to every agreement. We are asked, 'How do you guard against this and that contingency?' We have done what we can in the Agreement to make it perfectly clear and definite in regard to all contingencies, but the real answer to the critics is that, given goodwill on both sides, the possible difficulties will not arise, while without goodwill no agreement that anyone can make is satisfactory."

Below will be found the balance of payments between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom for 1936, as supplied to the British Government by the Trade Delegation of the Soviet Union :—

	£'000	£'000
<i>Proceeds of the U.S.S.R.</i>		
(After deduction of 97 per cent. of the value of canned salmon not handled by Soviet trading organisations : £904,000)		18,030
<i>Payments by the U.S.S.R.</i>		
For Exports	5,016	
For Old Ships	14	
For Re-exports	9,811	
For Freights	948	
6½ per cent. of Trade Turnover	2,014	
	<hr/>	17,803
Excess of Payments in 1935		2,032
Excess of Payments in 1934		5,866
		<hr/>
Total		25,701
According to Agreement Ratio for 1936 (1 : 1.4) payments should be ...		12,878
		<hr/>
Total Excess of Payments in 1934-1936 ...		12,823
Actual Ratio for 1936 = 1 : 0.70.		

We are indebted to the *Bulletin of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce*, of July 15, 1937, for the following table showing a comparison of the figures set out above with

BRITISH TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

those of the two preceding years during which the Agreement was in force :—

	1934	1935	1936
	£'000	£'000	£'000
U.K. Imports from U.S.S.R. ...	17,327	21,764	18,934
Deduction re Japanese Salmon	1,253	735	904
Net Imports for Purpose of Balance of Payments ...	16,074	21,029	18,030
Payments for Exports ...	8,455	5,966	5,016
" " Old Ships ...	275	241	14
" " Re-exports ...	3,613	6,375	9,811
" " Freights ...	1,442	1,470	948
6½ per cent. of Trade Turnover	1,535	1,999	2,014
Total of Payments ...	15,320	16,051	17,803
Agreement Ratios ...	1 : 1.7	1 : 1.5	1 : 1.4
Actual Ratios ...	1 : 1.04	1 : 0.95	1 : 0.70

[*Note.*—It should be noted that in computing the ratio of payments the amount of any deficiency or excess in respect of the previous year is taken into account. Thus, the excess payments by the U.S.S.R. in 1934 and 1935 are carried forward to 1936.]

ADVERSE TRADE BALANCES

From 1934, the year when the new trade agreement came into force, to 1937, the Soviet Union sold to the United Kingdom commodities to the value of nearly £37 millions less than that of the commodities which it purchased from the United Kingdom; in other words, during four years the trade account of the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union showed a total adverse balance of that amount.

A balance adverse to Great Britain is not new in Russo-British trading. We have to go back as far as 1925 to find one that is favourable to her. According to the *Board of Trade Journal* of May 20, 1937, during the 15 years from 1921 to 1936 inclusive, Great Britain imported from the Soviet Union goods to the value of £320,086,057. In the same period

her exports of produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom amounted to £72,483,001, and of imported merchandise (re-exports) to £71,007,419. Thus, the value of the exports during 16 years was £143,490,420. Excluding re-exports, a balance of trade remained in favour of the Soviet Union amounting to £176,595,637. If re-exports are included in the reckoning, this balance becomes £247,603,056. In 1934 and 1935, the United Kingdom was the largest supplier of the Soviet Union, but in 1936 dropped back to third place behind Germany and the United States. The following table, compiled from official Soviet sources, shows in thousands of roubles the value of the imports to the Soviet Union from several leading countries, and of the exports of the Soviet Union to them during the period 1934-1936 :—

			1934	1935	1936
			(In thousands of roubles)		
United Kingdom—	Imports	...	46,265	43,382	204,300
	Exports	...	69,182	86,255	353,500
Germany—	Imports	...	28,758	21,702	308,400
	Exports	...	98,431	66,048	120,400
U.S.A.—	Imports	...	17,875	29,484	209,000
	Exports	...	14,277	26,544	130,100

In each of the three years referred to above the balance of trade between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union was adverse to the United Kingdom and between the United States and the Soviet Union favourable to the United States. In 1936 the balance of trade between Germany and the Soviet Union was largely favourable to Germany.

When comparison is made between the value of the trade of the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the value of the trade of the United Kingdom with various other countries on the other, the results are not at all gratifying to contemplate. In 1937, among nations trading with the United Kingdom, as the following table shows, the

BRITISH TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet Union occupied sixth place for imports, twentieth place for exports, and first place for re-exports :—

TRADE DISTRIBUTION IN 1937

(£'000,000)

<i>Imports from</i>		<i>Exports to</i>		<i>Re-exports</i>	
U.S.A.	... 114.2	U.S.A.	... 31.4	Soviet Union	16.4
Argentina	... 59.9	Germany	... 21.6	U.S.A.	... 10.9
Denmark	... 36.6	France	... 21.4	France	... 8.6
Germany	... 36.2	Argentina	... 20.1	Germany	... 7.3
Netherlands	32.0	Denmark	... 16.9	Belgium	... 5.9
Soviet Union	29.1	Netherlands	... 15.0	Netherlands	2.1
		Sweden	... 13.0		
		Belgium	... 11.2		
		Norway	... 8.9		
		Egypt	... 7.9		
		Brazil	... 7.1		
		Finland	... 6.0		
		China	... 5.8		
		Poland	... 5.7		
		Italy	... 4.9		
		Switzerland	... 4.7		
		Netherlands,			
		E. Indies	4.4		
		Japan	... 4.3		
		Irak	... 3.3		
		Soviet Union	... 3.1		

Each side complains of obstacles placed in its way by the other. The Soviet Government has more than once declared that prices quoted by British firms are not competitive. But the fact that the £10 million credit was fully utilised for placing orders for British goods suggests that prices are not an insuperable obstacle to business. On their side, British firms criticise the Soviet Government's procedure. In 1936 foreign trade operations were transferred from abroad to

Moscow. It was urged by the Soviet authorities that the change enabled British firms to become better known in the Soviet Union, but the firms themselves complained of the inconvenience caused to them, not the least of which was the difficulty which they encountered in obtaining visas for their representatives from the Soviet Government.

A further grievance of British firms is the reluctance of Moscow to take final delivery of plant in this country. Yet another complaint from the British side is that no standard conditions for contracts are acknowledged by the Soviet Government, and that on each occasion when a contract is contemplated the conditions applicable to it have to be agreed upon, thus causing much unnecessary waste of time.

At the Meeting of the Executive Council of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce on January 20, the President, Mr. L. E. Mather, quoted a passage from a letter received by a firm from a Soviet Trade Organisation consenting to the withdrawal of certain disputed clauses in a contract, but adding that non-acceptance of the general conditions laid down would preclude extension of business relations with the particular firm in question in the future. "The Chamber," continued Mr. Mather, "is losing many members not necessarily because of the lack of Soviet orders, but because they will not have trouble with them owing to the difficulties involved."

On behalf of the Soviet Trade Delegation, Mr. Matusevitch replied that it was impossible to formulate general conditions applicable to all British firms; the conditions, he went on to say, must be applicable to the financial status of each firm and must take into account the manner in which it had fulfilled past contracts.

There is no doubt that, monopolising as it does the whole of the buying for Russia, the Soviet Government is inclined to arbitrariness. They forget that they are also sellers in Great Britain.

REVISION OF TRADE AGREEMENT

While there is ground for criticism here, the chief cause for complaint lies deeper. The Soviet Government has fulfilled the letter but not the spirit of the agreement, and in so doing has thwarted its whole purpose. When the document was signed, it was never contemplated by the British negotiators that re-exports would constitute so large a proportion of exports as a whole. The primary aim was to increase Soviet purchase of goods made in Great Britain, but it is the contrary that has happened. Re-exports have increased largely, both in absolute figures and in proportions. This circumstance, taken in conjunction with the persistence of large balances adverse to Great Britain, shows clearly that the trade agreement is far from being the success that was anticipated, and that it is in urgent need of revision.

Seeing that Great Britain is the largest purchaser of Soviet goods she should be able to require Soviet Russia to increase its purchases of British goods—of goods made in Great Britain and not merely those imported to Great Britain for re-export. It would not be easy for Soviet Russia to find alternative markets for the chief commodities which she exports to Great Britain. But as conditions are now, her position is strong; for it is as a single monopolist trader that she deals with a number of British traders competing for her favours. To persuade these traders voluntarily to form some organisation which would enable them to act towards the Soviet Union in much the same way as the Soviet Union now acts towards them appears to be impossible. If ever there was a case for government action, it is here. The Marxians would say, of course, that such intervention merely afforded one more indication of the inevitable concentration of capital which heralds the coming of the Socialist order. But let them say what they like. If we do not meet monopoly with cohesion, the Soviet Union will continue to make a fool of our trade, and reap handsome profits while doing so.

APPENDIX

The following table shows the value of the trade of the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1937, and for the pre-war year, 1913 :—

TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Note.—The designation "Domestic Exports" means exports of produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom, while that "Re-exports" signifies the exports of imported merchandise. In all instances the figures are taken from the *Accounts Relating to the Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom* for the appropriate years.

		*Imports from the Soviet Union £	Domestic exports to the Soviet Union £	Re-exports to the Soviet Union £	Domestic exports and Re-exports £
1913	...	40,270,539†			27,693,955†
1928	...	21,576,107	2,715,990	2,084,762	4,800,752
1929	...	26,487,499	3,743,489	2,798,544	6,542,033
1930	...	34,235,002	6,771,946	2,519,355	9,291,301
1931	...	32,285,563	7,291,319	1,911,895	9,203,214
1932	...	19,645,130	9,222,885	1,397,402	10,620,287
1933	...	17,491,099	3,341,414	957,356	4,298,770
1934	...	17,326,619	3,640,469	3,905,431	7,545,900
1935	...	21,763,984	3,482,510	6,243,547	9,726,057
1936	...	18,903,385	3,507,300	9,838,441	13,345,741
1937	...	29,096,536	3,083,023	16,432,557	19,515,580

* Not including bullion and specie.

† These figures relate to the territory of Russia as it was before the War

II

BRITISH SHIPPING AND TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

In the first part of this article it was stated that in the Temporary Commercial Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, ratios between Soviet payments and Soviet proceeds were defined up to 1937, after which an approximate balance of payments measured by the ratio 1 : 1.1 was to be maintained. An important item in the balance of payments was payment for freights, that is, for the chartering of British ships. In the Trade Agreement the Soviet Union explicitly expressed its desire to increase its utilisation of British shipping services, in other words, to increase the payment for freights in the balance of payments.

In the last six years the following payments for freights have been made to British ship-owners by the Soviet Union :—

				£
1932	1,122,569
1933	911,147
1934	1,442,000
1935	1,470,000
1936	948,000
1937	1,500,000 (approx.)

From the above figures it is apparent that the Trade Agreement has failed to ensure any appreciable increase in the use of British shipping. Hence payments for freights did not contribute so much as had been expected to the achievement of the prescribed balance of payments. This balance was in fact realised largely with the help of payments for re-exports, thanks to which the Soviet Union was able severely to limit its employment of British ships.

The increase in the payments for freights in 1937, shown in the above table, was mainly due to higher rates of freights and to the revival of grain exports from the Black Sea,

following upon an abundant harvest. But not always in the future will a bounteous harvest be assured. A large increase in the chartering of British ships cannot therefore be looked for; on the contrary, for reasons which will be stated shortly, a progressive reduction appears to be unavoidable.

The net tonnage of Soviet vessels with cargoes (including their repeated voyages) that entered or cleared United Kingdom ports since 1932 was as follows:—

			Entered with Cargoes.	Cleared with Cargoes.
			(Net Tons)	(Net Tons)
1932	252,334	191,389
1933	430,940	261,002
1934	426,394	273,697
1935	659,506	366,463
1936	746,798	264,089
1937	831,484	282,268

Since 1932 entrances have nearly trebled while clearances have increased by 47 per cent. The above table, which relates to cargoes carried by Russian ships only, shows at a glance that British purchases of Russian goods greatly exceed Russian purchases of British goods, particularly when it is remembered that almost the whole of Russian imports are carried in Russian ships.

Before the war a number of British liner companies maintained regular services between the United Kingdom and Russia. By carrying so large a proportion of its own imports and exports and chartering non-British ships the Soviet Union has eliminated these companies from the Russian trade.

It is not only the shipping of the United Kingdom which has suffered; that of other nations has felt to a lesser but yet considerable extent the effects of Soviet competition. The primary cause of this all-round decline is the rapid growth of the Soviet mercantile marine in recent years.

BRITISH TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Below are set out two tables, the first showing the increase in the number and tonnage of Soviet ships, as recorded in Lloyd's Register, the second the sharp decline in the chartering of foreign tonnage by the Soviet Union :—

SOVIET SHIPS

June			Number	Gross Tonnage
*1914	1,254	1,053,818
1921	465	412,459
1924	397	338,792
1925	377	322,257
1926	370	323,284
1927	346	308,882
1928	354	376,819
1929	379	440,506
1930	347	532,096
1931	386	603,836
1932	449	685,144
1933	443	843,212
1934	491	942,259
1935	577	1,113,781
1936	651	1,217,907

NOTE.—Of the 651 Soviet vessels recorded in June, 1936, 649 were steam and motor (having a gross tonnage of 1,214,937 tons, or 1.99 per cent. of world tonnage of that type), whilst two were sail (having a gross tonnage of 2,970 tons, or 0.3 per cent.). Motor vessels were 126 in number (320,656 tons, or 2.62 per cent.).

* For a comparison of the numbers and tonnage of Russian ships in the pre-revolutionary year, 1914, and those of Soviet ships in 1921 and subsequent years, to be correct, it would be necessary to include with the latter the numbers and tonnage of ships of the succession States: Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

CHARTERING OF FOREIGN SHIPS BY THE SOVIET UNION†

Year				Number of Vessels
1930	3,571
1931	4,045
1932	3,454
1933	3,001
1934	2,437
1935	2,272
1936	1,467

† *Monthly Review*, issued by the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R., December, 1937.

The increase in Russian tonnage was accomplished by building in Russia and in foreign countries, including the United Kingdom, and by acquiring second-hand foreign ships at low prices during the period of depression. No official figures are available showing the Russian tonnage under construction, but it is known that to the orders of the Soviet Government in 1936 seven cargo ships were being constructed in Great Britain and three each in Denmark and Holland, whilst several others have been subsequently ordered in France, Belgium, Finland and elsewhere.

The following information in regard to ships under construction within the Soviet Union has been published*: Before the end of 1937 a number of cargo ships will be launched, including three tankers: *Donbas* (10,500 tons), *Azerbaijan* (7,900 tons), and *Peredovik* (2,100 tons); two ore-carriers, *Kollektivizatsia* and *Stroitelstvo*, of 5,000 tons each; one timber-carrier, *Pinega* (3,350 tons); and the motor ship, *Spartakovetz* (1,100 tons). In 1938 one cargo motor ship, *Chapayev* (3,000 tons), will be launched, and in 1940 the following will be completed: the cargo motor ships, *Kamyshin* (1,500 tons), *Razin*, *Lepse*, *Pugachev* and *Ulyanov* (each of 3,000 tons); and *Trud* (of 11,000 tons); two timber-carriers,

* *Bulletin of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce*; November 15, 1937, p. 10.

Vaga and *Vychegda* (each of 3,350 tons); and one tanker, *Ural* (7,900 tons).

In all probability the above list of ships under construction is not complete; it is merely given to show that the capacity of Soviet shipbuilding yards is large and varied.

As a consequence of the growth of its mercantile marine, the Soviet Union has secured an increasing share of the carrying trade between the Soviet Union and other countries. The following table shows the percentages of the imports and exports of the Soviet Union conveyed in Soviet ships over a period of seven years :—

Year			Imports to U.S.S.R.	Exports from U.S.S.R.
1929	41.2%	7.0%
1933	88.6%	10.4%
1935	67.4%	24.0%
1936	90.6%	33.3%

In an article in the May (1937) issue of the *Economic Survey*, a monthly bulletin issued by the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce, containing a summary of the achievements of Soviet shipping, it was said that :—

From 1929 to 1936 the share of Soviet shipping in carrying exports had increased nearly five-fold, and in carrying both exports and imports nearly four-fold.

Of Soviet exports sold on c.i.f. terms a third were carried in Soviet ships in 1935 and nearly one-half in 1936.

Still larger claims were made in the *Monthly Review* of January (1937), issued by the U.S.S.R. Trade Delegation in Great Britain. "In 1936," said this publication, "the Soviet mercantile fleet carried one-half of all cargoes exported from the U.S.S.R., while in 1935 Soviet boats carried only one-third of them. Of the cargoes exported from the Baltic ports of the U.S.S.R., Soviet boats carry about 60 per cent." (p. 38).

The enlargement of the Soviet mercantile fleet has not only enabled it to carry a greatly increased proportion of Soviet imports and exports, but has resulted in its securing a growing share in the carrying of foreign freights.

In 1934 Soviet vessels made only seventeen voyages with foreign freights; in 1935 the number of such voyages was 115. *According to the Soviet Chartering Organisation in Moscow, in 1936 foreign firms chartered Soviet ships to the extent of 700,000 tons for the transport of cargoes from British to European ports.

NO BRITISH TIMBER SHIPS

The subject of chartering British tonnage for the carrying of timber from the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom calls for special treatment.

Before the war half the timber imports from Russia to the United Kingdom were conveyed in British ships. No figures are available, showing specifically the proportion of such imports carried by British ships in 1935. Yet it is possible to ascertain this proportion with tolerable accuracy. Timber from the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom is almost wholly transported in tramp steamers. Reference to data concerning the British tramp steamers eligible for subsidy in 1935 shows that in this year they carried 119 cargoes, totalling 501,000 tons of timber out of 1,940,000 tons of timber brought to the United Kingdom from the Soviet Union; that is to say, in 1935, 25.8 per cent. of the exports of Russian timber to this country were conveyed in British ships. For the following year, 1936, Board of Trade Returns are available. They show that out of a total of 114 million cubic feet (about 2,300,000 tons) of timber imported into the United Kingdom from the Soviet Union in 1936, only 10½ million cubic feet (about 10,000 tons), or 9.2 per cent., were carried in British ships.

**Bulletin of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce*; April 15, 1937; p. 6.

BRITISH TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The following table, compiled from Board of Trade Returns, gives the proportions of the shipment of Russian timber from the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom in vessels of different flags in 1936 :—

Russian	33.6%
Norwegian	14.5%
British	9.2%
Danish	8.4%
Swedish	7.8%
Greek	7.8%
Latvian	7.3%
Others	11.4%
				100.0%

An official list of charterings published on May 12, 1936, disclosed that out of 85 voyages of timber vessels to United Kingdom ports, which had been arranged for the period ending June 30, half were to be undertaken by Soviet vessels and the remainder by vessels of flags other than British; thus not a single British ship was chartered to carry Soviet timber to Great Britain. Subsequently, the Soviet Chartering Organisation did offer a considerable amount of business to British shipowners but on terms which all but a few deemed unacceptable.

Again in 1937 the Soviet Chartering Organisation endeavoured to arrive at some arrangement with British shipowners; but with no better results than on former occasions. British shipowners were convinced that rates had been artificially forced down as a consequence of competition of Russian and other foreign tonnage operated on a low-wage basis, and felt that if they accepted the Soviet offers they would later

find themselves in a dilemma when the freight market improved.

RUNNING COSTS

What is the reason for the drastic decline in the Soviet chartering of British steamers for the carrying of timber from the U.S.S.R. to the United Kingdom?

The Soviet authorities urge that :—

(1) British tonnage is less suitable than Scandinavian and Baltic for the carriage of "handy-sized sawn timber cargoes which preponderate in Soviet requirements."

(2) That the minimum chartering rates fixed by the Baltic and International Maritime Conference at Copenhagen to which the majority of British owners adhere, are too high and that consequently chartering on the open market is preferable. It should be added that the Soviet Government opposed the movement for freight co-operation required by the British Government when granting the tramp subsidy in 1935.

The answer to the first objection set out above is that in 1935 British ships were not considered unsuitable for chartering, and that in subsequent years the Soviet Chartering Organisation was willing to employ British ships, provided that they could get them on their own terms.

The second objection raises a number of points which apply not merely to British ships engaged in the timber trade but also to British ships engaged in other trades.

Of these, the first is that economic considerations of the ordinary kind do not enter into Russian "running costs." Such information as is available suggests that the cost of running Soviet ships is much less than that of running British ships. On an average the nominal wages of Soviet seamen are less than half those of British seamen. How important are wages in the reckoning may be judged from the fact that they amount on British ships to 64 per cent. of the total running costs, including those incurred for victualling.

The following is a comparison drawn up in June, 1936, of the monthly cost of wages (exclusive of food) on vessels of 2,750 tons gross under the flags of different nationalities :—

British : £292 to £317 (according to the seniority of the officers).

Greek : £156.

Finnish : £154.

U.S.S.R. : £144 (Taken on the average of the standard wages for officers).

Latvian : £143.

In the foregoing comparison it is assumed that the manning is the same in all instances ; but it should be mentioned that the Russian scale provides that voyage bonuses of from 15 to 20 per cent. for officers and 15 to 20 per cent. for ratings may be paid in addition to the prescribed wages.

The Russian wages have been converted from roubles into pounds at the official rate of approximately R 25 = £1. According to the internal value of the rouble, Russian wages were a mere fraction of British wages. In 1936, 25 roubles in Moscow would only buy as much as five or six shillings would purchase in London.

It is quite evident that under existing conditions British ships cannot possibly compete in the Russian trade with ships of the Soviet Union ; or, for the matter of that, with ships of some other flags.* This disability is fundamental and almost impossible to overcome. The wages of British seamen, which are paid according to National Maritime Board scales, cannot be lowered, for their level is determined by the general standard of living in the United Kingdom ; and this standard of living is much higher than that prevalent in the Soviet Union.

Apart from the fundamental obstacle described, British shipowners have encountered many lesser impediments when striving to transact business with the Soviet Union. In

* The wages of Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Dutch seamen are on much the same level as those of British seamen.

negotiating for the employment of foreign shipping as well as for the purchase of foreign goods, the Soviet Government makes full use of its monopolist powers. It insists, for example, that all chartering operations should be centred at Moscow; consequently, British shipowners are not so well informed as they were in the days when the business was offered in London. An attempt to compel owners to accept arbitration in Moscow largely failed; but, with the object of securing their acquiescence, pressure is constantly maintained, particularly in time-chartering negotiations. Then, Soviet ships are given preference over British ships in regard to loading and discharging, pilotage, ice-breaker assistance, and port facilities generally.

THE REMEDY

It is clear that the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union is self-sufficiency in the sea-carriage of its imports and exports. With this object in view, it is rapidly expanding its mercantile fleet, and in particular is increasing the number of its timber-carriers. At the same time, it has the overwhelming advantage of being the sole charterer of ships for the Russian trade while, because it controls all the ports throughout the Soviet Union, it is able to give its own ships better facilities than those which it places at the disposal of foreign ships. Merely to complain of these circumstances is futile. In Russia the State has socialised everything and is omnipotent. It is only natural, therefore, that it should exert to the full its monopolist powers when dealing with foreign shipowners. To say this, however, does not mean that no countervailing action can be devised.

As has been shown in the section of this article dealing with trade, Great Britain is the largest buyer of Soviet goods. Here at hand is a leverage which might well be used to induce the Soviet Government to increase its chartering of British ships. We might say to it, for example: "As we buy so much from you, it is not unreasonable that a stipulated proportion of our purchases should be carried in British ships

at remunerative freights based on market rates generally prevalent." Immediately, the question arises : Who should be the protesting "we"? At one time it was suggested to the timber importers that they should purchase f.o.b. and insist upon an increased proportion of their purchases being carried in British ships, but they replied that in face of the monopolist powers of the Soviet Government they were quite unable to do so.

Whereas in 1936 only 9.2 per cent. of the British imports of timber from the Soviet Union were conveyed in British ships, in the same year *all* German imports of timber from the Soviet Union were carried in German ships. The German importing organisation doubtless had the backing of the German Government, and was therefore able to insist that all timber which it bought should be transported from the Soviet Union in German ships.

German experience suggests a way out of our own difficulty. When the Trade Agreement between Great Britain and the Soviet Union is revised amendments should be introduced providing for the carrying of a stipulated proportion of British purchases from the Soviet Union in British ships, and giving British liners a fair share in the carrying of Soviet purchases (exports and re-exports) from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union. Unless action of this kind be taken, British shipping is destined to disappear at an early date from the Russian trade ; and all but vanish from the Baltic. The losses from such a disaster would not be confined to the commercial sphere. If the smaller class of vessel of from 1,500 to 3,000 tons, which in normal times found ready employment in the Baltic, is finally driven from it, the interests of national defence will suffer grievously.

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MAP BRISTOL 211-
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Communism and Fascism

By F. J. C. HEARNshaw, Litt.D., LL.D.

The author of this article is well known. He is Emeritus Professor of History in the University of London, and has written many important works, some of which have deeply influenced political thought.

I

THE Great War, we are told, was fought to make the world safe for democracy. If that were so, it most lamentably failed to achieve its purpose. For never in recent times has Democracy been in so grave danger of extinction as it is to-day. From one great State after another it has disappeared : it vanished from Russia in 1917 ; from Italy in 1922 ; from Spain in 1923 ; from Turkey in 1925 ; from Poland in 1926 ; from Jugo-Slavia in 1929 ; from Austria and Germany in 1933. And even in countries where it still survives it is seriously menaced. More particularly, in America it is threatened by the dictatorial methods of President Roosevelt as well as by the lawless violence of Mr. Lewis's new unionism ; in France it is imperilled on the one hand by the revolutionary activities of the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, and on the other by the reactionary excesses of the *Action Française* ; in Great Britain it is challenged from the left by Sir Stafford Cripps and his Popular Front, and from the right by Sir Oswald Mosley and his unpopular front.

II

If we ask what are the causes of this general and widespread slump in Democracy, the answer is that Democracy has declined mainly because of its own inherent defects. In spite of its many theoretical merits—which together suffice to make it ideally the best form of government known to men—it has

failed because it has not been able to keep order ; to administer justice ; to keep itself free from corruption ; to achieve quick decision and prompt action ; to formulate a clear and consistent policy. It everywhere has become split by faction ; paralysed by party conflicts ; perverted by unscrupulous demagogues ; prostituted by personal and sectional interests. Above all, it has in every country been undermined by Socialism which, while professing to support it and adopt its methods, in reality has destroyed its foundations. For Democracy postulates the unity of the nation while Socialism proclaims the disruptive class war ; Democracy implies liberty, while Socialism imposes a freedom-destroying equality ; Democracy respects the rights of property while Socialism aims at the expropriation of both landlords and capitalists ; Democracy is the embodiment of reason in politics while Socialism is the rationalisation of robbery.

III

Nevertheless, Socialism, so long as it can delude majorities into voting for its specious and seductive programmes, is content to adopt democratic methods. Fabian sapping is frequently, for a long time, more effective than violent assault. But so soon as democratic majorities cease to be cajoled, then Socialism throws off the mask and becomes frankly revolutionary, it repudiates Democracy and advocates dictatorship. If anyone seeks evidence of this let him read the highly illuminating but extremely injudicious utterances of Sir Stafford Cripps and his allies in *The Problems of a Socialist Government* (Gollancz, 1933). In short, Socialism easily and speedily develops into Communism.

Communism has been not inaptly defined as "Socialism with the courage of its convictions." The two, indeed, differ not at all in essence but only in degree. Communism is, of course, the more extreme of the two. If one seeks for detailed differentiation, one may remark that whereas (1) Socialism would abolish private property only in land and capital, Communism would abolish all private property ; (2) Socialism would distri-

bute wealth according to merit, Communism would make mere need the criterion ; (3) Socialism would use money as a medium of exchange, Communism would not ; (4) Socialism recognises and employs the State, Communism would abolish it ; (5) above all, Socialism prefers constitutional methods, Communism chooses violence.

IV

Communism, then, is the supreme enemy of Democracy. It was Communism under Lenin and Trotsky that overthrew the inefficient Russian democracy of Kerensky in 1917. It was Communism, under Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg that menaced the German Republic in 1919. It is Communism everywhere that seeks to subvert popular government, uproot established religion, confiscate private property, extinguish the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, and set up the dictatorship of the criminal class.

V

Fascism is the natural and inevitable reaction against the menace of this revolutionary and remorseless Communism. Since votes mean nothing to Communists ; since their appeal is to force ; it is only by force that their attacks can be repelled. In every country where it exists, Fascism (by whatever name it may be known) is the indirect product of Communism. In Italy, Mussolini would never have been heard of but for the anarchy and violence of the communist (and syndicalist) revolutionaries of 1919-22, before whom the so-called democratic government of Facta and Giolitti was impotent and inane. Similarly, in Germany, it was the ineptitude of the Weimar administration, together with the growing insolence of the Moscow-fed Communist Party, that was the main source of the success of Hitler's move in 1933. In each case, Fascism was the instinctive response of a middle class threatened with spoliation and extinction at the hands of a predatory proletariat, drunk with the fermenting poison of Marxism. In England, Fascism displays the same features on

a reduced scale. If Sir Oswald Mosley is less formidable than Mussolini, and more ridiculous than Hitler, it is because the menace of Communism is not as yet so serious here as it was on the Continent, and because the middle class here (although unorganised and inert) is more numerous and potential than that in any other European country.

VI

The principle of homeopathic medicine is that "like cures like." Hence Fascism as a remedy has many of the characteristics of the disease, Communism, which it is intended to counteract. Were it not for the existence and prevalence of the dangerous disease it would not be required, and would indeed be intolerable.

It is possible, therefore, to indicate a good many characteristics which Communism and Fascism equally display. Both of them are antagonistic to democratic government; to the system of party organisation; to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of public meeting. Both of them are authoritarian, dictatorial, cruel, ruthless, unscrupulous, war-like. Both of them demand and produce a passive, servile type of character. Both Reds and Blacks submissively don uniforms, march in squads, shout slogans, shut ears, lift hands, and smash opponents' heads. Freedom and individuality they cast away. The Duce, the Führer, the Leader, the Dictator—each of them winds up his slavish automata and sets them off to work his will.

VII

Numerous, however, as are the points of resemblance between Communism and Fascism, there are elements of difference which must not be overlooked. For some of them are fundamental. We have already remarked that while Communism is dominantly proletarian, Fascism is mainly middle-class. We may further note the following important differences: (1) Communism is cosmopolitan, international,

anti-national. Its most distinctive slogan is "Workers of the world unite." Fascism, on the other hand, is intensely national. In every country where it rises—Italy, Germany, Spain, Britain—it takes peculiar forms determined by local circumstances. (2) Communism was first formulated and is still dominated by renegade Jews—men like Marx and Engels, Trotsky and Bela Kun—men terrible in their hatreds and sanguinary ferocities. Fascism, on the contrary, goes to the extreme of anti-semitism. It is fanatical and irrational in its antagonism not only to renegade and revolutionary Jews, but also to the great majority who are sober, loyal, and eminently valuable citizens of the States in which they have their domicile. (3) Communism is blatantly atheistic and bitterly hostile to religion of every sort. It denounces it as "the opium of the people." Fascism is anxious to come to terms with religion. Mussolini's concordat with the Papacy was a masterpiece of diplomacy. Franco is ostentatious in his piety. Even Hitler would fain live at peace with both Protestantism and Catholicism, if only they would obey him. (4) Communism is materialistic; Fascism is idealistic. (5) Communism repudiates the past and despises history; Fascism exalts and glorifies the past and makes history its guide. The main menace of Mussolini, indeed, comes from the fact that he regards himself as a Roman whose duty and destiny it is to restore the dominion of the Caesars over the whole Mediterranean region. (6) Communism denounces the family and treats marriage with contempt; Fascism regards the family as the very foundation of the State and is strong to conserve the sanctity of marriage vows. (7) Communism regards the State itself as but a passing phenomenon: when the proletarian paradise is attained "the State will wither away." Fascism, on the other hand, regards the national State as the supreme and final form of social organisation. It is "totalitarian," *i.e.*, dominant over all other associations.

VIII

Communism, as the above brief summary makes clear, is the great implacable enemy of Christian civilisation. It is lamentable that so many well-meaning, muddle-headed innocents, including even a number of silly curates and sentimental nonconformist ministers, should play with it as though it were a harmless and philanthropic reform movement. Still more alarming is it that, although the great Trade Union leaders, who know its deadly workings, denounce it, so many of the idiotic *intelligenza* of the Labour Party are disposed to line up with it in a so-called Popular Front. Above all, it is ominous that the great inert Democracy goes on its placid way apparently oblivious of the fact that the triumph of Communism in this country would involve a repetition on a still more gigantic scale of the horrors that have devastated in turn Russia and Hungary, pre-Mussolini Italy and pre-Hitler Germany, pre-Salazar Portugal and pre-Franco Spain. If democratic governments show themselves to be incapable of defending the menaced middle-class from the proletarian wolves that are preparing to devour it, then the menaced middle-class is bound to organise itself in some sort of Fascist force in order to defend itself. So long as it is impracticable for a Conservative candidate, because of Communistic rowdyism, to hold a public meeting in a Labour constituency; so long as the influx of a Moscow-instigated mob portends violent assault upon any procession of which the Third International does not approve; so long as the fundamental democratic principles of free speech and free movement are denied by communistic dictators, and so long as democratic governments refuse to defend these rights, so long will Fascism be spontaneously generated. In short, so long as Sir Stafford Cripps is possible, so long will Sir Oswald Mosley be inevitable, if not, indeed, necessary.

In the Event of War between Soviet Russia and Japan

I

By GENERAL N. GOLOVINE, C.B.

The writer of the following article, already well known to readers of CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA, was a Professor at the Military Academy in St. Petersburg, and a high Staff officer during the Great War. He enjoys a European reputation as an authority on military science, and has published numerous works in English, including: "The Problem of the Pacific in the Twentieth Century" (Gyldendal). He is a regular contributor to military publications in this and other countries, and his books and articles have been published in numerous languages.

THE Bolsheviks assert that troop supplies east of Lake Baikal are so organised that, in the event of war, transport from European Russia and Siberia would be unnecessary. In Vladivostok, vast factories, named after Voroshilov, have been equipped, and half-way along the route beside the river Amur, between Khabarovsk and Nikolaevsk, a strong industrial centre is said to have been established, called Kom-somolsk, which town has now been joined with Khabarovsk by a railway and a metalled highway. Without questioning the expediency of the Bolsheviks' attempt to base the provisioning of the Red army, which is to defend the Maritime Province and Amuria, on local sources of supplies, it may confidently be asserted that it is merely another of those bluffs which, in the ultimate reckoning, lies behind all their enterprises. In order to accomplish such an aim, radical changes

of demographic and economic conditions, such as only partially could be accomplished by the persistent efforts of many generations, are essential. The most which the Bolsheviks could actually achieve at present would be to establish an intermediate base in the Far East, capable of ensuring the conduct of war for a period of three to four months. Consequently, if Japan were to decide upon a prolonged campaign, she would completely upset all the plans of the Red General Staff. The Red army, concentrated to the east of Lake Baikal, and not based on Siberia and European Russia, may be compared to the garrison of a besieged fortress.

The necessity of the Red forces, defending the Far East, to be based on Siberia and European Russia, simplifies the problem under discussion. We need only to determine the number of trains which a modern army requires for its existence. We shall express, as the strength of an army, the number of infantry divisions of which the army is composed, presuming that it is supported by other kinds of troops, as well as by corps and army establishments, to an extent sufficient to enable it to cope with the strategical problems which face it.

Let us first consider Russia's war with Japan in 1904-1905. We commenced hostilities, having nine infantry divisions in our "Manchurian Army," supplied by the single-track Siberian railway, which had a traffic capacity of seven to eight military trains in twenty-four hours. During the course of the war, the numerical strength of the Army, and the traffic capacity of the railway increased. At the time of the battle of Mukden, at the end of February, 1905, our three armies operating in Manchuria, had twenty-two infantry divisions, and the traffic capacity of the line reached twelve to fourteen trains in twenty-four hours.¹ Allowing for the fact that about 15 per cent. of the trains which arrived brought reinforcements, that is, were employed in bringing new troop units from European Russia, we may conclude that, in order to maintain the army in being, *approximately eleven trains were required*: half a train to each division.² The fact that the

forces were continually from 20 to 40 per cent. below strength proved that, although part of the commissariat supplies (meat and forage) was obtained locally in Manchuria and Mongolia, the number of trains just indicated was too small.

It is not uninteresting here to observe that the Japanese General Staff estimated the forces, which Russia could establish in Manchuria, from the traffic capacity of the Siberian railway. The following is an interesting extract from the plan of campaign of the Japanese Army, published in a work prepared by the Japanese General Staff, entitled *The History of the Japanese-Russian War of 37-38 Meidje (i.e., 1904-1905)* : “. . . As was foreseen by our General Staff before the beginning of the campaign, in spite of the fact that the numerical strength of the Russian army exceeded that of ours by *nearly seven times*, Russia was not in a position to achieve any marked preponderance in the Far East. . . .” The chief cause of this inability was “the impossibility of organising supplies to the Far East for an army of more than 300,000 soldiers. The population of Eastern Siberia was very small, and the army could not be fed on local resources only. Although Manchuria could have supplied a part of the necessary forage, most provisions had to be brought from Russia ; but the traffic capacity of the line was not equal to the transport of such provisions as well as of war material, arms, men and horses.” A strength of 300,000 men under the conditions prevailing during 1904-1905 was equivalent to the strength of an army consisting of fifteen infantry divisions. The Japanese General Staff, who were conscientious pupils of the German General Staff, correctly estimated the maximum power of Russia's forces, which it expected to meet on the battlefields of Manchuria.

Since the Russo-Japanese War, the progress of military science made giant strides forward, and the supplies necessary for a modern war have correspondingly expanded. To illustrate this point, I will cite two figures from the book written by Colonel Hénaff and Colonel Bornecque,³

who studied the working of the French railways during the Great War. In 1914 the French General Staff estimated that an infantry division, going into battle, required ten to twenty waggons every twenty-four hours; but, actually, during the 1918 campaign, two trains proved to be necessary, consisting of fifty waggons each: a hundred waggons in all. When there is a lull in the fighting, the magnitude of such requirements, of course, becomes less; but the interval is utilised in bringing reserves up to strength, and conveying reinforcements of men and materials.

In addition to infantry divisions, a modern army consists of numerous other kinds of units: aviation, heavy artillery, cavalry, engineering, and troops for chemical warfare. Bearing these considerations in mind, it may be accepted that the standard requirement for the campaign of 1918 on the Western European front was two trains in twenty-four hours for each infantry division.

If we study contemporary French and German military literature, we observe a similarity of estimates as regards the quantity of supplies required every twenty-four hours by an army in the future war. According to such estimates, an army intended for strategical aims of secondary importance needs 2.7 to 3.1 trains in twenty-four hours for each infantry division. But one intended for a decisive attack, and supplied for this purpose with up-to-date technical equipment to enable it to overcome the enemy's barrage, needs 3.2 to 3.4 trains every twenty-four hours.

The estimates of the Bolshevik General Staff are much lower than these standards. "On account of purely economic causes," wrote V. Triandafilov,⁴ "mechanisation in various armies has been effected to different degrees. All armies may be divided into two groups, according to the degree of their mechanisation. To the first group belong the armies of Western Europe, of which an example is the French army. To the second group belong the armies of Eastern Europe, typical of which are the Polish and our own Red army."

IN THE EVENT OF WAR BETWEEN SOVIET RUSSIA AND JAPAN

Starting from this basis, Triandfilov contends⁵ that "it is possible at present to base on a *single-track line*, either an army consisting of not more than three infantry corps,⁶ or one fulfilling auxiliary purposes. The daily requirements of these armies during prolonged operations is from ten to thirteen pairs of trains, but a *stronger army* (one of five infantry corps⁷ with additional equipment for attack) *requires either two single-track lines or one double-track.*"

If we bring together all this information into one table, we shall see that the estimates of the Red General Staff are less than those of the General Staffs of Western Europe.

NUMBER OF TRAINS REQUIRED EVERY TWENTY-FOUR HOURS BY AN ARMY IN ACTION

	Number of trains in 24 hours required by one infantry division.
Russian Army during Japanese War of 1904-1905	0.5
French Army in 1918	2.0
Western European estimates :	(found to be insufficient.)
(a) Army carrying out auxi- liary operations	2.7 to 3.1
(b) Army carrying out decisive operations	3.2 to 3.3
Estimates of Red General Staff :	
(a) Auxiliary operations	1.1 to 1.4
(b) Decisive operations	1.4 to 1.6

While not denying that the level of technical equipment of an army in Eastern Asia will be lower than that of a modern Western European army, I am bound to say that, in spite of different economic conditions, the Japanese General Staff, a true follower of German military ideas, is exerting all its efforts to raise the level of technical equipment of its army. They learned a lesson in 1932 when, because it lacked the technical means of overcoming machine-gun fire, the Japanese army at Shanghai was held up for a long time by an inferior Chinese army. Since then, the equipment of the Japanese army has been greatly augmented.

Should war break out with the Soviet Union, the Japanese would strive to the utmost to supply themselves with the maximum amount of technical equipment, and would rapidly surpass the level of technique which prevailed on the French front in 1918. Inevitably the Red Army would strive to emulate this example. That is why I consider that the estimates of the Red General Staff, cited above, would prove to be too small in the event of war with Japan. They would be more correct if they were modelled on Western European standards.

Let us begin by examining the military transport capacity of the Amur and Ussuri railways, which now have double tracks. More than 2,000 kilometers of the Amur and Ussuri lines pass along the Manchurian frontier, from which they are never further away than 100 kilometers. Enemy aircraft could, therefore, easily inflict frequent damage upon them. The sparsity of the population could even allow of aerial descents on a small scale. The hatred of the local inhabitants towards the Bolsheviks is such that rebels, or "partisans" as they are called in the Far East, would freely wreck the line. Under circumstances so exceptionally unfavourable to the smooth running of the standard number of military trains held to be necessary, if there is to be no hitch, the ordinary or normal train service would become inadequate; by ordinary or normal is meant that which is essential for supplying the needs of the railway itself (conveyance of fuel, etc.), and of the civilian population. In addition to the supply and service trains, armoured trains would have to pass along the line to defend it against attacks from without, and G.P.U. trains to defend it against attacks from within. Here it may be mentioned that the number of G.P.U. and "international" troops, with which the Bolsheviks keep the population of the Maritime Province and Amuria in subjection, amounts to 50,000 men.

Considering all these circumstances, we may confidently state that, even if the railways worked at full pressure, the Bolsheviks would be unable to convey along them more than an average of twenty-four to thirty pairs of military trains in

twenty-four hours. The conclusion then is unavoidable that with the maximum effort the Bolsheviks would not be able to have an army of more than ten infantry divisions in Amuria and the Maritime Province—one, moreover, equipped only for secondary strategical operations.⁸

According to information which has managed to appear in print, the Bolsheviks, at the present time, have four to five infantry divisions in the region of Vladivostok and Nikolsk-Ussuriysk, one at Iman, one at Khabarovsk, one at Birobidjan, and two at Blagoveshchensk. This strength is the maximum possible; to exceed it would be to reduce the fighting capacity of the infantry divisions.

If the Bolsheviks sought to help the Red army, which defends the Maritime Province, by bringing up the army concentrated in Trans-Baikalia, the two armies would be separated from each other by 1,250 kilometers as the crow flies. The Japanese in Manchuria would then find themselves in the position of Napoleon during 1809-1813 when he had to fight simultaneously in Spain and also east of the Rhine. The war in Spain did not hinder him from penetrating eastwards, and by 1809 he reached Vienna and by 1912, Moscow. It may seem inappropriate to make a comparison here with Napoleon's campaign in Spain, for the Soviet forces are immeasurably greater than were those which Spain was able to put in the field. But let us not repeat the errors which were so extensively prevalent in Russia prior to the war with Japan in 1904. At that time, the following comparisons were frequently heard: The Russian Army in peace time has 1,000,000 men; the Japanese, 150,000. The Russian Army is increased by general mobilisation to 3,750,000 men; the Japanese to 360,000. Unfortunately, many of us cling to this erroneous way of thinking, which is now carried over into the fashionable sphere of aviation. It is high time to give up such conventional arguments when speaking of strategy, which, unlike mathematics, is not an exact science, but resembles it because it is founded on calculation, and is no respecter of vague phraseology, no matter how beautiful it may be.

A Red army, concentrated in Trans-Baikalia, and from there breaking into Manchuria, could only base itself on the single-track line which branches off the Siberian line at Karymskaya, and joins the Chinese Eastern Railway at the station called Manchuria (Manchuli). There could be no doubt that if Japanese troops were to be forced back from the Manchurian frontier into the interior, they would thoroughly damage the Chinese Eastern Railway as they retreat. In this circumstance, the Red army, advancing from Trans-Baikalia, would have to rely on the single-track Chinese Eastern Railway with its reduced transport capacity. The Trans-Baikal army would then have to go onwards for more than 300 kilometers, as far as the summits over the Great Hingan. The necessity for it to traverse so great a distance, and the defensive advantages of the Hingan Range, would afford the Japanese ample time to settle accounts with the Red army in the Maritime Province, or, at least, to render it entirely harmless by means of a close siege, after which the Japanese Command could easily concentrate a large part of its forces with the object of smashing the Red army from Trans-Baikalia. It would, in my view, even be advantageous to the Japanese High Command if the Red army were to cross the summit of Hingan, and, with its rear towards the roadless wastes of Hingan, involve itself in a decisive encounter.

Let us presume that, before hostilities opened, the Bolsheviks begin to build a second track from Karymskaya to Manchuria station, and that as they proceed into Manchurian territory they continue this second track alongside the existing line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Such an undertaking would require so much time that, though enabled to increase its strength as a result of building the second track, the Red army, advancing from Trans-Baikalia, would have no strategical significance; for during this period the Japanese would have been able to settle with the Red army which they had immobilised in the Maritime Province.

To what extent could the Trans-Baikal army be reinforced? At present there are in Trans-Baikalia six infantry divisions, which, added to the ten infantry divisions in the Maritime Province and in Amuria, give a total of sixteen infantry divisions east of Lake Baikal. To these sixteen divisions are attached 1,500 aeroplanes, 1,000 tanks, and three cavalry divisions. In addition, in Outer Mongolia the Bolsheviks have formed three Mongolian cavalry divisions. In the event of hostilities the Red forces east of Lake Baikal could be strengthened by twelve infantry divisions at present quartered in Siberia and east European Russia, that is, by four divisions from each of the following military regions: Siberia, Ural and Volga. The strength of the Red army in Trans-Baikalia would then be brought up to eighteen infantry divisions, which, together with the ten infantry divisions in the Maritime Province and Amuria, would give a total strength of twenty-eight infantry divisions.

According to the estimates of the Red General Staff, included in the table given previously, thirty-six pairs of trains would be necessary every twenty-four hours to keep such a force supplied. Inasmuch as it has a traffic capacity of forty-eight pairs of trains in twenty-four hours, the Siberian railway would be capable of meeting such a demand. Nevertheless, as I have already stated, the standards determined by the Red General Staff are quite insufficient. If we apply those of Western European military science we reach the conclusion that not less than eighty pairs of trains would be needed to supply twenty-eight infantry divisions. Can the Siberian railway provide that number? Theoretically, the answer would be in the affirmative if only the conditions prevalent were similar to those which exist in Western European countries and the United States, and existed in the former Russian Empire. Those having special knowledge of railways will appreciate how great is the effort required to double the traffic capacity of a line several thousand kilometers in length. Is Soviet Russia capable of such a task?

In order to answer this question it is necessary to consult the latest available data regarding the condition of Soviet railways. As is well known, damage to locomotives *en route* is usually very rare; in fact, only isolated instances of damage occur. Even during the most intense period of railway activity on the North Donets line in the years 1914, 1915 and 1916, there was only *one* such instance. According to the Bolshevik statistical publication, *Sotsialisticheski uchet na zheleznodorozhnom transporte* (third year of publication, No. 2, published by Transzheldorizdat, Moscow, 1934), there were in 1932 under Bolshevik management, on lines of the Siberian railway, east of the river Ob, 1,421 cases of damage to locomotives; and in 1933, 1,673 cases; that is to say, 4.6 cases daily. In addition to these cases of damage to locomotives, there were in 1932, 6,625 cases of failure to provide trains with locomotives, and in 1933, as many as 13,617 such cases. In other words, these totals represented the number of trains which were unable to run because there were no locomotives to pull them.

That transport should have been held up for this reason is as unbelievable to Europeans to-day as it would have been to Russians before the Revolution. Uncouplings of trains as a consequence of negligence and technical defects occurred on an average every 500 kilometers; of these accidents, 33 per cent. were caused by the overheating of the axle-boxes.

Still more recent data is to be found in an article by V. P. Shakhgildyan dealing with conditions on the Perm railway (the working length of which is 3,775 kilometers) and published in *Sotsialisticheski transport* (No. 2, 1936), issued by the journal, *Gudok*.

According to the author, in February, 1936, only 34.6 per cent., and in March of the same year only 37.5 per cent. of the trains kept to schedule. Continuing on page 16, he wrote: "Although accidents attributable to personnel are fewer than last year, they are still very large. During the first quarter of 1935 there were 47 occurrences of trains being sent on to

tracks already engaged; 71, of points being forced open; and 118 locomotive and train collisions at stations. During the first quarter of 1936 there were 33 occurrences of trains being run on to engaged lines, 93, of points being forced open, and 96 collisions at stations."

V. P. Shakhgildyan added that: "Invariably the direct cause of wrecks was fracture of rails under the trains," and that the chief causes of this "mass fracturing of rails" were "the *insufficient routine maintenance of the track*, the bad quality of the routine maintenance of the track, lack of discipline among the men working on the track, who sometimes break the most elementary rules of track maintenance and repair."

The very latest information available in regard to Soviet railways is to be found in *Gudok* of December 21, 1937, and January 4, 1938. In these issues it is stated that all the railways of the Soviet Union invariably fail to work according to schedule, not because none exists but because they do not keep to it. "As a result of the disgraceful work of shunters and drivers, many important stations are choked up with traffic." A large number of these stations have been transformed "into waggon-sidings. The waggons stand; the locomotives stand, too, heating the sky; all fuel economy flies into the air."

"The Barabinsk section," the writer went on, "is one of the key sections on the Omsk line. During the last ten-day week of December, Barabinsk station has been converted into a train siding. Trains, bringing coal from the Kuznets Basin, stand here five to six days and nights. On December 19 and 20, for example, eleven trains remained here for six days and nights." On the Omsk Railway, "Tatarskaya station has turned into a barrier. Here the trains are formed somewhere at the back and await their turn for hours. . . ." On the same railway, "abandoning trains at small intermediate stations has become a system, and invariably they are removed only in three to four days' time. Nearly all trains stand still for four to five hours on the approaches to Omsk." . . . "Trains move

at tortoise speed, lose time *en route*; stoppages and the abandonment of trucks *en route* have become frequent. . . ." On the Eastern Siberian railway, "on November 30, at Zima, Utai, Kimiltei and Uda 2, ten trains stopped simultaneously as a result of damaged automatic brakes. While repairs were being made, the trains were standing while others going in the same direction were put out of their schedule. Thus, in November, as a result of faults in the automatic brakes, more than 100 trains were kept standing for 800 hours. . . ."

From the state of disorder just described, to which the Bolsheviks have brought the Russian railway system, it may certainly be concluded that it is beyond their power to double the traffic capacity of the Siberian railway. Especially difficult would it be for them to do so on the section between Verkhneudinsk and Chita, where the line crosses the Yablonovyi range; for in order to increase the traffic capacity, a complete reconstruction of the track and even a change of route would be necessary.

In view of the foregoing facts, I personally believe that the maximum total traffic capacity of the Siberian railway cannot exceed 48 pairs of trains. This total traffic capacity is from 25 per cent. to 30 per cent. greater than the military traffic capacity. In order to demonstrate my strategical arguments, I will conditionally accept the premise that the Bolsheviks, contrary to my expectations, could increase the total traffic capacity of the Siberian railway by 25 per cent. or 30 per cent., thus bringing it up to 58-62 pairs of trains. In that event, the numbers of pairs of military trains, that is, the military traffic capacity, could reach 48, which, according to the requirements of modern warfare, would be adequate for the supply of 15 to 18 infantry divisions. Only if the Red army were required to serve an auxiliary purpose would the maximum number of divisions be utilised; for the conduct of the main operation alone, fewer divisions would be needed. The following considerations explain the reasons why, in this second instance, fewer divisions would be required :—

According to published data, already the Bolsheviks have concentrated 1,000 tanks and 1,500 aeroplanes in the Far East. According to calculations based on the experiences of the Great War, each tank in action must be supported by forty-six men in the rear, and each two-seater aeroplane by sixty men in the rear.⁹ Hence, in order that they may work without a hitch, 1,000 tanks and 1,500 aeroplanes require a personnel of 130,000 men, for whom supplementary transport of supplies would be essential.


Consequently, I am of the opinion that the Red army, of sixteen infantry divisions, 1,500 aeroplanes and 1,000 tanks, at present concentrated east of Lake Baikal, is the maximum force which the Bolsheviks would be capable of assembling in the Maritime Province, Amuria and Trans-Baikalia. Only if the Japanese severed the communications along the Amur railway would there be strategical justification for bringing up the remaining twelve infantry divisions at present quartered in the military regions of Siberia, Ural and the Volga.

In that event, those supplies conveyed along the Siberian railway to serve the ten divisions now concentrated in the Maritime Province and Amuria, might be unloaded in Trans-Baikalia. But the position of the Red forces in the Maritime Province would then resemble that of the Russian troops in the Kwantung fortified zone, who were defending Port Arthur in 1904-1905.


In the second part of his article, which is to appear in the next issue of CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA, General Golovine will discuss the strength of the forces which the Japanese would be able to deploy in the event of war with Soviet Russia, and comes to the conclusion that, although they lack absolute numerical superiority over the Red Army, the Japanese would be able to attain numerical superiority in the right place and at the right time. The writer will also examine the question, often discussed in the foreign, and especially the American press, whether a Red air force, operating from Vladivostok, would be able to carry out a decisive raid upon Japan.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- ¹ *Istoria Russkoi Armii i Flota*, Vol. XIV, p. 69. Published by Obrazovanie, Moscow, 1912.
- ² Trains consisting of thirty-five waggons each.
- ³ *Les chemins de fers français et la guerre*, by Col. Hénaff and Col. Bornecque. Librairie Chapelot, Paris, 1922; p. 63.
- ⁴ *Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii*, by V. Triandafilov. State Military Publishers, Moscow, 1932; 2nd edition, p. 51.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 148. Italics by V. Triandafilov.
- ⁶ Nine infantry divisions.—AUTHOR.
- ⁷ Fifteen infantry divisions.—AUTHOR.
- ⁸ See in table above, sub-division (a), of Western Europe estimates.
- ⁹ Lecture by General Debeney, former Chief of the French General Staff, on : *La guerre moderne et les machines*; published in *La Revue de la semaine*, February 10, 1922.



IN THE EVENT OF WAR BETWEEN SOVIET RUSSIA AND JAPAN



Radio in Soviet Russia

IT must be borne in mind that the Soviet Union is not a member of the International Broadcasting Union, and consequently information of a reliable nature is more difficult to obtain from this country than from anywhere else. In addition, the atmosphere of suspicion, which pervades the whole of Russian life, and the impossibility of free travel render the task of an investigator far from easy. The writer's own experience is that officials in Russia are more anxious to question foreigners about conditions in the country from which they come than to reveal facts concerning their own system. In any case, the evidence given by one Soviet official rarely agrees with the story of a second. During the last eighteen months, frequent administrative changes have taken place in all branches of Soviet life, including the Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs. Thanks to the machinations of the ubiquitous Trotsky, it has been considered necessary to comb out the Communist Party, the army, industry and what remains of the Church in order to rid the country of wreckers and oppositional elements.

EARLY HISTORY

While the world in general recognises Signor Marconi as the pioneer of wireless telegraphy, Russians declare that the history of wireless began in the year 1885 with the experiments made by that eminent physicist, Professor A. S. Popoff. By 1889 he had succeeded in constructing a radio-telephone. His idea was to couple an aerial and earth to the coherer in order to make it more sensitive to static discharges. On May 7, 1895, Professor Popoff wrote: "I hope that, when properly developed and perfected, my apparatus will be utilised for the transmission of signals at a distance by means of high-frequency electro-magnetic oscillations, once a source of such oscillations has been found." In 1900, transmitting stations

were erected and communications began over a distance of forty miles.

Although this method of wireless telegraphy was used during the Russo-Japanese war up to a distance of seventy miles, by that date the Marconi system had proved to be superior to all others. By the time of the Great War, the use of wireless for general purposes was still in a backward condition and, because they neglected the elementary precaution of sending their messages in code, the efforts of the Russians to communicate orders to their armies in the field met with disastrous results. The Germans were able to pick up and act upon these transmissions.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION

Delays in the development of broadcasting in Russia were inevitable, for the country remained in a state of complete chaos from 1917 to 1922, during which period many of the ablest scientists either left Russia or were killed. If a trace of blue blood could be detected among the comparatively small number of those that remained, they were vilified by Zinoviev as "Manure for proletarian culture." It was not until December, 1922, that Lenin and Trotsky decided to develop broadcasting: they then realised that it would be a vital medium for the guidance of the masses along the path of communism. The first political speech to be transmitted by wireless was delivered on the thirteenth day of that month to the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. In the following year it was decided to set up several radio stations for the purposes of propaganda, and also to serve newspapers within a radius of four hundred miles from Moscow.

In 1924, a regular broadcasting service was instituted and carried on by a company, *Radio Peredatcha*, the shares of which were held by the Government. In February of that year a reporter, home from Russia, gave an account of a radio concert, which he heard in a village not far from Moscow. He told us that the voice from the loud-speaker declared: "This is the voice which will soon be heard in every village in

Russia.¹ Soon there will be no more ignorance, for the wireless will bring knowledge to all." Not long afterwards, Vinogradov, chief of the radio bureau, spoke in the same vein, saying that "the Revolution has awakened the Russian villages from their primeval slumber, and the radio will give them a rapid cultural development."

On June 25, 1926, *World Radio* published an interesting article on the development of wireless in the Soviet Union, with particular reference to the villages. "There is," said this journal, "a certain spice of danger attached to the missionary work, for the rural inhabitants of the Soviet Union are in a sorry state of backwardness, and, in general, are very superstitious; in many cases they have suspected wizardry and demolished the entire 'unholy' apparatus, seriously mauling the wizards themselves."

In the next two years progress in broadcasting was remarkable. By 1926 loud-speakers had been installed at all the principal railway stations, in 12,500 reading rooms and over 6,000 workmen's clubs. Schools were also supplied with receiving sets, for the Communist Party considered that this form of propaganda, as well as being highly efficacious, would compensate for the shortage of reliable Bolshevik school teachers.

Up to 1924, the Soviet Government had shown hostility to all wireless amateurs who possessed receiving sets of their own. Later, they realised that amateurs could play an important rôle in experimental work and in popularising wireless. As a result of this change they formed the "Society of Friends of Radio," which did much for the development of radio technique, and the application of wireless telegraphy to political purposes. Within a year, the Society could boast of 170,000 members, while their magazine, *Wireless Enthusiast*, registered a net sale of 50,000 copies per month.

Before the first Five-Year Plan of industrial reorganisation began, a chain of broadcasting stations had been established, and in Moscow alone there were said to be 26,000 licence-

holders. As the factories could produce but few wireless sets, and those only at an exorbitant price, crystal sets made by amateurs were commonly in use. In July, 1928, *Radio Peredatcha* was wound up and Russian broadcasting was taken over by the Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs.

No description of the period 1917-1928, cursory though it may be, would be complete without mentioning the name of Professor Bonch-Bruевич, who has so often been described as the "Marconi of the Soviet Union." He was the pioneer of radio development during this post-revolutionary period, and he made his experiments at Gorki², under circumstances of extreme difficulty.

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND AFTER

It would be hard to think of a task more complicated than the development of a broadcasting system in a country with an area occupying one-sixth of the land surface of the globe and having a population of about 165,000,000, of whom the vast majority are technically backward and in the throes of prodigious social and political changes.

In conformity with the other projects in this great scheme for industrialisation, the Five-Year Plan provided for broadcasting on a grandiose scale. Many millions of roubles were devoted to the construction of wireless stations and to the manufacture of receiving sets. According to the plan, twelve million sets were to be installed and the transmitting stations were to have an aggregate potential of 2,366 kilowatts. The Soviet government wished to erect twenty-nine new stations and complete 1,030 relay posts, which would be of greater value to the Bolsheviks than the individual sets. Wireless was to be used for two purposes: to bring news of trouble to the central government and to send out reports and orders from the Kremlin to the people of the country. What Moscow wanted in these anxious days was rapid contact with its distant subjects: in Siberia, Turkistan, Ukraine or Georgia.

Extracts from the Soviet press show that the lack of technical knowledge, and the inefficiency and corruption, which characterised so much of this period, caused a serious setback to the progress of the Plan. A correspondent of the *Prague Radio Amateur*, who visited the Soviet Union a few years ago, described the situation as follows: "Bureaucracy has become as rampant in broadcasting organisations as it has become rooted in other Soviet official departments." Much of the time was spent in settling petty squabbles between the Commissariat and minor organisations.

It has been possible during the last few months to glean from the Soviet press the fact that the regional wireless committees have not been free from subversive elements. On August 5, 1937, the *Siberian Soviet* wrote: "For a long time the villainous Fascist, the enemy of the people, Pedelma, has been at the head of the wireless committee at Novosibirsk and strives to give preference to his own men. Out of twelve members, six have been declared enemies of the people, and excluded from the Communist Party."

In spite of such revelations and continual political complications, there can be no doubt that the rôle played by radio in the economic and cultural life of Russia is becoming increasingly important. Successful navigation in the Arctic Seas, long-distance flights and scientific research work are only rendered possible by a satisfactory system of communication by wireless.³

PROGRAMMES

Because of the low cultural standard of the listeners and the "chaos in the ether," caused by unchecked activities of amateur transmitting stations in the early days of broadcasting in the Soviet Union, the question of programmes presented considerable difficulties. It was not until 1928 that the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs took charge of programmes and, under its auspices, there was organised a so-called Radio Soviet, composed of representatives from the Communist Party, the Trades' Unions, and Art and Educa-

tion. Their first decision was to devote early programmes to combating drunkenness and debauchery by the dissemination of Communist ideology. Such programmes failed to appeal to listeners, and later were changed by the introduction of lectures on history, politics, and the anti-religious campaign, while concerts and other musical items became increasingly popular. At this time, as there were few proletarian composers of note, classical music was broadcasted. A conscientious announcer on one occasion referred to the works of Beethoven as "the products of the accursed capitalist régime, which bear the stamp of the feudal epoch."

Progress in the improvement of programmes has been hindered because the local organisations in the provinces, which have been supplied with transmitting sets, cannot afford to employ good artists and have therefore to rely upon relays from Moscow. Such relays are often unsatisfactory owing to the poor quality of the instruments, and technical inefficiencies. Factories and clubs, which possess transmitting sets, are supposed to have all their programmes approved by a local Communist censor. Yet such broadcasts do give satisfaction, if only because the various nationalities in Russia are able to hear concerts and news in their own languages or dialects. Programmes are broadcasted in sixty-two different languages.

From the writer's own observation, the use of propaganda speeches from loud-speakers has been largely overdone, and few people listen to the announcements coming from the wireless apparatus erected in public parks and gardens. In any case, the quality of the loud-speakers is so wretched that it is almost impossible to follow the gist of the talks.

If questioned about their radio programmes, Russians will unanimously agree that the special features and the talks on sport are the most popular. Officials in the Moscow wireless station tell you of the unqualified success of their broadcast from the bottom of the Black Sea; also of Professor Pavlov's scientific experiment, which consisted first of all of a twenty-minute talk and was then followed by ten minutes' barking by a decapitated dog.

News items form the bulk of the wireless programmes, and it is not unusual to find that news is being distributed six or seven times a day. Announcers in Soviet Russia are able to make full use of the press, and whole articles from the official papers are frequently read out for the benefit of listeners. The figures given below show the constitution of programmes during the first quarter of 1937 :—

Opera, Ballet, Operette	8.1%	
Selections from Operas	3.4%	
Symphonic Music	23.3%	
Folk Music	2.1%	
Amateur Music	0.9%	
Television	1.7%	
Literary Programmes	4.7%	
Educational Talks	5.1%	
News	39.9%	[2.3%]
Children's Broadcasts	5.1%	[4.8%]
Physical Training	3.7%	
Miscellaneous	2.0%	

N.B.—It is difficult to make an exact comparison between Soviet and English programmes, for statistics in this country are arranged in a slightly different manner from those in the Soviet Union. The figures in square brackets denote the equivalent percentages in the English programmes.

Children's programmes are especially popular, and cleverly arranged. Contributions by the children are encouraged, and frequently the children themselves are brought to the microphone to sing, or recite poems of their own composition. In recent years, contrary to original expectation, it was discovered that broadcasting to the schools could not replace the services of teachers in any way; wireless programmes could only be used to supplement the normal school curriculum.

In 1936, the music of forty-five foreign and fifty-two Russian composers was broadcasted from stations in the Soviet Union; among the former, the four most popular were Beethoven, Berlioz, Wagner and Mozart; of the latter Tchaikovsky was first, with Rimsky-Korsakov, Glinka and Scriabin "honourably mentioned."

All suggestions and criticism of programmes may be sent to the Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs, post free, but it appears that the people do not make full use of this privilege, probably because paper and envelopes are far from cheap.

PROPAGANDA

In Soviet Russia, wireless propaganda differs in no way from ordinary propaganda; in fact, with the introduction of broadcasting the Soviet government may be said to have placed its propaganda machine in front of the microphone. The Soviet Union was first in the field with broadcasts to foreign countries, claiming that such a step was necessary in order to provide the proletariat abroad with correct and reliable information about conditions, "as they really are," in the new Soviet State.

The first foreign paper to realise the tremendous possibilities of propaganda export across the ether was the *Christian Science Monitor*, and on June 8, 1925, their correspondent in Moscow wrote: "The Soviet Government is quite alive to the vast importance of radio as an instrument of propaganda." But it was not until 1926 that listeners in England picked up the *Comintern* station from Moscow and were amazed to hear Bolshevik propaganda speeches in their own tongue.

A year later, in October, 1927, the *Times of India* printed a leading article, entitled "Broadcasting Bolshevism," ending with these words: "If the development of broadcasting is to be attended by a fresh Russian danger, every government concerned may see in broadcasting not an instrument of social progress, but a very grave potential danger."

The *Comintern* station was particularly active in anti-religious work and during Church holidays, Lunacharsky and other prominent Bolsheviks used to conduct vitriolic attacks upon the Christian religion. After such speeches there followed parodies on the Bible; "humorists" ridiculed the three wise men before the manger, and other episodes from the New Testament.

The Soviets found a new use for the wireless at home. Before the completion of collectivisation and the subjugation of the peasantry, the Bolsheviks met with serious difficulty in the collection of grain which formed their main export and was urgently needed for the purchase of machinery. The peasants refused to sell their grain at the low prices offered to them by the government. An article in *The Radio Magazine* tells us that broadcasting was enlisted to intimidate peasants who had grain but did not wish to surrender it to the authorities. The radio was used to denounce those peasants who were suspected of having grain, and to "request" them to bring it to the nearest State granary.

At the present time two radio stations, one conducted by the *Comintern* at Moscow and another at Leningrad, are responsible for broadcasts in foreign languages to European countries. Sixteen foreign languages are used, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Hungarian, Czech, Swedish, Dutch, English, German, Greek, Estonian, Latvian, Finnish, Norwegian, Lithuanian and Esperanto.⁴

The following is a typical broadcast programme from the *Comintern* station :—

13.00 Swedish Broadcast.

17.00 *Kolhoz* candidates for the Supreme Council at the microphone.

18.00 Broadcast for *Kolhozes*.

20.30 News.

20.58 Relay from Red Square.

21.00 English Broadcast.

22.00 French Broadcast.

23.00 Spanish Broadcast.

Officially it was explained that the nightly foreign broadcasts were for the benefit of students in Soviet Russia. Surely 11 p.m. is an unusual hour for students to listen to lectures in Spanish?

Talks to foreign countries aim at the complete deception of listeners. They are carried out in all the important European and Oriental languages, and consist chiefly of extravagant exaggerations about conditions in Russia, and of anti-capitalist

and anti-religious propaganda. During recent months the *Comintern* has delivered a series of particularly violent attacks on the Vatican.

LICENCE FEES

For the first decade after the Revolution, the Soviet government relied largely on amateurs to conduct experimental work in wireless, and also to construct receiving sets. The price of a radio set was far beyond the means of the working man. For this reason the Bolsheviks concentrated on the development of relay posts in the villages, clubs, schools, and railway stations. By the end of the first Five-Year Plan the number of private sets had markedly increased, and on January 1, 1933, the Council of People's Commissars decided to introduce a licence fee for the use of wireless sets. The rates were:—

Crystal sets	3 roubles
Private sets employing continual current					18 "
Private sets employing alternating current					24 "
Sets for public use	50 "
Sets for collective use	36 "

The main objects of this new impost were twofold. Firstly, the Soviet government required additional funds for the development of wireless; secondly, it was desired to penalise the man who possessed a private set capable of picking up foreign stations. The authorities were naturally anxious to prevent Soviet citizens from listening to talks or services from abroad (a religious service was known as "incense in the air").

The Government experienced great difficulty in collecting these fees, and in the first year only succeeded in securing 15 per cent. of the estimated sum. A year later, as a result of extreme measures, 50 per cent. of the total sum was paid. The Russian correspondent of the *Funk Express* described the position on June 12, 1934, as a "Listeners' Strike."

According to the latest statistics there are in the Soviet Union 3,760,400⁵ communal and individual sets, but as the price of a wireless set is still exorbitant,⁶ it is the communal set which plays the prominent part in broadcasting to the masses. For the present, the position is unlikely to change.⁷

ORGANISATION

Although the Palace of Broadcasting was to have been completed in 1936, the headquarters of the organisational and technical staff are still at the Central Post Office in Moscow. This building, which was constructed by German engineers, is outwardly drab and severe. The writer had the opportunity of visiting the studios some months ago. Those who enter the door leading to the radio department will find a sentry with a fixed bayonet within. Before proceeding further it is necessary to obtain a pass, and, as elsewhere in Soviet Russia, a delay of some forty minutes occurs before permission is granted to view the studios.

The main room is the radio theatre (100 feet by 25 feet, approximately), which contains a small stage. This room was originally intended as a concert hall for the use of the workers in the Post Office and was only subsequently appropriated by the State Broadcasting Company. Apparently no special arrangements for the improvement of acoustics have been made. The general impression is one of carelessness and untidiness, which is in marked contrast to the premises of our own Broadcasting Corporation.

A system of dual control is in force. On the one side there is the All-Union Broadcasting organisation, which is responsible for the programmes, and on the other the technical staff. The radio committee retains one general orchestra of eighty musicians; an opera orchestra of sixty musicians; and two light orchestras.

Broadcasting in Russia, as we have seen, has always had a dual purpose. Firstly, it is intended to educate and enlighten the masses through the medium of scientific talks and cultural music; secondly, mindful of the psychological effect, wireless in the Soviet Union has been systematically used for the fostering of political thought.

Many years ago a foreign enquirer asked Lenin what communism meant. The revolutionary leader replied: "It is the Republic of the Soviets, and electrification." Wireless is now an integral part of this electrification.

REFERENCES

- ¹ There are in the Soviet Union about 200,000 villages.
- ² Formerly Nizhni Novgorod.
- ³ To celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Communist Revolution, *The Financial Times* issued a special supplement. Amongst other articles in this number there was one on "Communication Systems in the U.S.S.R.," by a special correspondent. The writer, while mentioning modern technique, did not say that it is virtually impossible to telephone from Moscow to one of its suburbs. I spent three hours waiting one evening before I was put through to a house only twelve miles from the centre of the town. Alas, when I was connected I could hear nothing, as a band was playing somewhere on the line. I repeated the attempt on two other occasions and no one seemed at all surprised that I could not get through to the number which I wanted. Similarly, while listening to the wireless in Moscow, continual difficulties are experienced because the voltage is always varying to an alarming degree. This makes the radio a doubtful pleasure. Furthermore, the correspondent never mentioned the fact that letters from England to Russia and *vice versa* frequently disappear. They are always delivered days late, and sometimes opened by the censor.
- ⁴ While Stalin was in prison in Baku, over thirty years ago, he studied Esperanto.
- ⁵ In England there are over eight million licence-holders.
- ⁶ A reasonably efficient set costs 956.75 roubles, which, at the official rate of exchange, equals about £36. The average wage in U.S.S.R. is roughly 250 roubles per month, so that it would take the normal worker nearly four months' pay to purchase a decent wireless set.
- ⁷ "How could they find out in Russia the truth of what is happening here, in the West?" exclaimed with emotion, an old German engineer, who has lived in Russia almost all his long life and played a not inconsiderable rôle among the Bolsheviks in Moscow, as a prominent specialist in his profession. "For example," he said, "there is the radio : one of the chief sources of information, you would suppose. Doubtless you know that in the Soviet Union they 'stifle' all undesirable programmes from abroad, but another and more certain method is also applied : only those radio receivers are freely sold from which local stations can be heard. Receivers which pick up foreign waves are subjected

to the severe control of the Commissariat of Home Affairs. Every such apparatus has a special number, and its owner, as well as the apparatus itself, are 'stalked.' It cannot even be given for repairs in Moscow, except through the appropriate department of the Commissariat. Of course, engineer specialists could easily construct receivers for themselves, but they are afraid to do so, and prefer to sit quiet and listen to the local programme, rather than run the grave risk of being accused of having connections with abroad, and of spying. But even this is not all: the vast majority of workers and employees, being poor, avail themselves of the simplified radio sets which are given away almost free, and through which only strictly selected agitational programmes can be heard. That is how the radio in Soviet Russia, instead of being a source of information, has long ago been turned merely into a means of propaganda."— *Posledniya Novosti* (Paris), February 3, 1938

The Significance of the New Soviet Constitution

The elections to the Soviet Parliament or Supreme Council took place on December 12, and the deputies assembled in Moscow in January for the first session, which opened on January 12 and lasted for a few days only. That is now old history, but in retrospect the significance of the new constitution can be judged more objectively than when it was contemporary news.

The Soviet parliament consists of two chambers, the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities. The total number of deputies is 1,143, divided approximately equally between the two chambers, those elected to the Council of the Union being chosen by single-member constituencies, roughly coinciding with the city municipal wards and the rural *rayons* or districts, that is to the primary administrative areas into which the whole country is divided; while the deputies to the Council of Nationalities are elected by block votes of all the electors in each Federal and Autonomous Republic and Autonomous Area. The eleven Federated Republics each send 25 deputies, the smaller Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Areas, 11 and 5 deputies respectively, while the National Areas, small racial enclaves, send one apiece. The two chambers are not comparable to an upper and lower house or to a Senate and Legislative Assembly. Both have equal powers of initiating legislation and new laws must pass both chambers. The difference between them is somewhat similar to that between the former German Reichstag and Reichsrät; that is to say, the deputies representing the Republics in the Council of Nationalities are in theory the representatives of the different races and nationalities included in the Soviet Union, while the deputies in the Council of the Union represent the

electors in their capacity of equal citizens of the Soviet Union.

The Government, or in a sense the Cabinet, consists of the People's Commissars and the heads of certain other Departments of State having the status of a commissariat, such as the President of the Council of the State Bank, the President of the Committee of Higher Education and the President of the State Planning Committee. In all, the Council of People's Commissars has 29 members. Constitutionally the Council of People's Commissars is responsible to the Supreme Council, that is to parliament as a whole; but under the Constitution the Supreme Council normally meets only twice a year for a short session and the two chambers in joint session appoint a Presidium, somewhat in the nature of a permanent executive committee, to exercise, in the intervals between sessions, legislative and administrative functions, such as the removal and appointment of People's Commissars. The Presidium consists of 37 members, including a President and eleven Vice-Presidents, one for each Federated Republic. None of the People's Commissars is also a member of the Presidium, which, however, includes Stalin and several of the highest personages in the Communist Party. In practice it seems that the Supreme Council, when it meets, will do little more than ratify all the acts of the Presidium since the last session.

The Soviet Government and its admirers greeted the new Constitution as an important advance towards democracy. Because about 98 per cent. of the electorate voted, the elections were a triumph for democracy. Because every unopposed candidate (and so far as is known no constituency presented more than one candidate) was elected it was also a triumph for democracy. It is easy to ridicule a "democracy" that permits, or rather compels, the electors to elect as their representatives only those persons who are approved by the Government, but it is more to the point to try to discover to what extent the new parliament is an instrument of democratic government, how far, in fact, can it be described as a democratic institution. According to the Constitution, candidates may be nominated

by public organisations, societies of toilers, party organisations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organisations and cultural societies. Needless to say, the sole political party tolerated is the Communist Party, while religious communities are not recognised. In actual fact what happened was that, throughout the country, meetings were held of peasants and workers, at which, apparently without exception, formal resolutions were passed, begging one of the prominent members of the Government or Party to accept nomination. Stalin himself received over 3,000 such nominations, while Stalin, together with Voroshilov, Yezhov and Kalinin received in all 7,666 nominations. As an expression of loyalty to the leaders of the country this result was highly satisfactory, but it is difficult to believe that the mass of electors could have taken the proceedings very seriously, for it must have been obvious that these nominations were merely formal gestures of loyalty and nothing more. The real candidate for each constituency was afterwards chosen at a single meeting of electors organised by the local Party organisation. At these meetings only one name was proposed and adopted without dissent. However some 30 to 40 nominated candidates disappeared between the dates of nomination and election, and were apparently replaced by others without the formality of any meeting of electors to approve the substitution.* There is, of course, not the slightest doubt that the candidates who disappeared had in the meantime been discovered to be Trotskyites and wreckers. One of the most outstanding cases was that of Mezhlauk, formerly a high Party official and President of the State Planning Commission. His name was removed from the list of candidates and nothing has been heard of him since. In such circumstances it is fair to assume that all the candidates finally elected were originally

* This would seem already to have constituted a violation of the Constitution, which grants immunity from arrest to all members of the Supreme Council without the consent of the Council. Since these candidates were unopposed they were already in effect members of the Supreme Council.

selected by the Central Party organisation. They were, of course, actually proposed at the election meetings by workers, peasants and others of humble and proletarian origin, but if they had been the free choice of the electors why were rival candidates never proposed?

The Soviet Government made a great point of the fact that the deputies were chosen from all ranks of the population and represented all interests. The following is the composition of the Council of the Union : members of the Communist Party, 81 per cent. ; workers, 45.3 per cent., peasants, 23.7 per cent., officials and members of the intelligentsia, 31 per cent. Of the workers, over 80 per cent. were described as employed in Party, Government, economic, military or communal service. In other words, this 80 per cent. held some kind of official position. Of the peasant deputies, 60 per cent. held official posts, and nearly 20 per cent. were presidents of collective farms. Of the deputies coming under the head of officials and intelligentsia, about 19 per cent. were engaged in Party activities, about 46 per cent. were in State employ, and 14 per cent. in the defence forces : that is, mainly army officers. In all, nearly 80 per cent. of this category consisted of persons holding more or less important public posts, including a fairly numerous contingent from the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, in other words, members of the Secret Police. The remainder consisted for the most part of writers, artists and professional persons. It will be seen that a comparatively small proportion of the Council of the Union consists of deputies who can in any sense be regarded as *a priori* independent and impartial. It may be presumed that all members of the Communist Party, all State and public officials, all army officers, etc., are more or less tied to the Government by interest and are concerned to maintain the *status quo*. This is not to deny that these deputies may be prompted by the good of the country as a whole, but it may be regarded at best as doubtful whether they would support any popular desire for reforms against the wishes of the Government, that is to say the Party. It may be argued, and

probably by the admirers of the Soviet régime it is argued, that the Party is concerned for the good of the country and the population as a whole. But that is not the point, which is, does the new Soviet parliament afford the people a democratic instrument for imposing its will on the Government? In other words, is the Government of the Soviet Union in any way more of a popular Government now than it was before the new Constitution came into being?

One of the slogans propagated by the Soviet leaders during the election campaign was the amalgamation of the Party with the non-Party section of the population. The elections were hailed as a triumph for the so-called Party and non-Party *bloc*. In European political jargon a political *bloc* usually connotes the union of two or more parties out of a multiplicity of parties to form a Government or an opposition. The word seems scarcely applicable to the Soviet system where only one political party is allowed to exist. But it was obvious that what was meant was that the former hegemony of the Communist Party was to be mitigated, and non-Party sympathisers with the régime were to be admitted to a share in deciding the policy of the Government. Various posts in the State apparatus, formerly a strict preserve for Party members, may now be held by non-Party persons of unquestioned Party loyalty. There are two possible explanations of this move; it may be that the Party's support is no longer so necessary to the Government as formerly and that Party demands are sometimes inconvenient or embarrassing; it may equally well be that the non-Party section, which constitutes about 98 per cent. of the total population, is beginning to show more pronounced signs of resentment against the privileged positions and preferential rights of the members of the Party. Possibly there was an element of both in the decision, for which the official explanation was that the non-Party and bourgeois irreconcilables having now practically disappeared, the former distinction between Party and non-Party is out-of-date. Circumstances that may throw a side light on the situation developed about the beginning of Febru-

ary last, when numerous editorial and contributed articles appeared in the Press alleging that many useful and politically orthodox persons had been victimised during the recent purges. It was stated, with considerable circumstantial detail, that local Party organisations in a large number of cases had expelled members from the Party and deprived them of their posts, and thus of their livelihood, on false accusations and trumped up charges of political heresy, embezzlements and similar crimes. In some cases these charges had been made by persons who hoped in this way to increase their reputation for vigilance and loyalty to the régime. Sometimes accusations seem to have been deliberately fabricated with a view to rendering vacant a desired post or to cover up the accuser's own defalcations. Against the Party courts, which heard the charges, it was alleged that they did not trouble to verify the accusations or to hear the accused in their own defence. In some specified cases these Party courts had, on general principles, sentenced scores of persons to deprivation of their Party tickets, and *ipso facto* of their jobs, at one swoop.

The recent history of the Bolshevik Communist Party certainly shows a progressive degeneration of principle, and a deterioration of internal integrity. Since the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial in August, 1936, the old Bolshevik chiefs, one after another, have been eliminated, and it is impossible to estimate how many of the smaller fry have fallen victims to the purge. Possibly a suppressed wave of disappointment and disapproval of the line of policy followed by the Stalin faction was responsible for a certain lukewarmness among the more thoughtful and devout members of the Party. For many things have been done in the names of Marx and Lenin, which these prophets would strenuously repudiate. Whether this ideological cleft in the Party was the direct cause of the purge, or whether the purge itself caused a disintegration of the Party is not altogether clear. A lot of mystery shrouds the domestic affairs of the Party and in their visible reactions it is difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. But two results

emerged, firstly the morale of the Party declined, thus favouring intrigue, careerism and a general laxity of principles; secondly the economic efficiency of the country deteriorated because of the growth of bureaucratism and lack of economic security. Honest and capable officials in all branches of economic activity feared to assume responsibility or take any initiative, while the place seekers and knaves found many opportunities for making mischief and sowing discord and distrust among their fellows. In such circumstances it is not surprising that much of the old spirit of sacrifice in the cause and for the common weal, which certainly actuated the original Bolsheviks, has been dissipated, and membership of the Party of recent years has been valued more for the material privileges it confers than for the duties and obligations it imposes.

L. E. H.

Heavy Industry in the Soviet Union

By Th. MAKCHEEFF

I

The author of the following article is a son of General F. A. Makcheeff, who was a Professor in the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Army, and who wrote numerous works on military administration and also on railways in war-time. After completing his course in the First Cadet Corps, Mr. Th. Makcheeff entered the Institute of Engineers of Communications, named after the Emperor Alexander I, where he achieved the highest possible distinction.

For seven years he was in Government service as a Railway Construction Engineer. In 1909 he founded his own enterprise, which became one of the most important of its kind in Russia. Among the works which his firm undertook were: the construction of 120 miles of the north-eastern Ural Railway and the same length of the Murmansk Railway within the Arctic circle; the widening of the St. Petersburg port; and the sluicing of the North Donets river.

After the Revolution, Mr. Makcheeff carried out similar undertakings in France and in French Colonies, including the rebuilding of railways and other works in areas devastated by war, irrigation works in Algeria and, as the result of an award in a competition, the military air base at Kenitra in Morocco. In 1928, together with Clemenceau's son, he entered into a contract with King Amanullah to conduct railway surveys in Afghanistan; while carrying out this task he kept in close contact with the British Legation at Kabul.

Since 1935 Mr. Makcheeff has contributed numerous scientific articles to French technical journals, and has also

written much on political and economic problems in the Soviet Union, a task for which he is well qualified by reason of his long experience.

THE official statistical annual entitled *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R.*, published in Moscow, includes, as heavy industry, all undertakings having not less than 16 workers as well as mechanical motive power, or 30 workers without it : irrespective of the type of industry to which they belong (p. 2, note 1). Such a definition of "heavy" industry is entirely out of keeping with European interpretations, and in this article we shall understand by it only the metallurgical and machine construction industries, and those industries engaged in supplying them with the necessary raw materials.

This unusual official Soviet definition, which even includes underwear and domestic linen workshops, with 30 women plying needles and scissors, is enough to show the difficulties to be encountered when dealing with Soviet statistics. These statistics are still further complicated by the following circumstances :—

(1) Data are expressed in percentages unaccompanied by the quantities upon which they are based, or in units which signify nothing essential.

(2) There is no stable monetary unit which could provide even the slightest basis for making comparisons.

(3) It is impossible with one's own eyes to verify the data supplied by the Soviet authorities.

Let me illustrate each of these circumstances by means of an example :—

(1) On the posters at the Paris Aviation Salon in 1936, the Soviet authorities expressed the number of civil aeroplanes in 1925 as 100 per cent., and in 1935, as 500 per cent. Whether there were 5000 aeroplanes in 1935 compared with 100 in 1925, or 5 compared with 1, it is impossible to tell from such data.

(2) By the stroke of the pen the artificial exchange rate of the Soviet rouble was changed about two years ago from 13 francs to 3 francs, and this change was reflected not only in

the price of goods in the home market, but even in the quotation of the rouble on the Black Exchange, which, in both cases, proclaimed the value of the rouble to be 0.80 francs (Poincaré franc).

(3) Only those foreigners are allowed into the U.S.S.R. for prolonged periods of time, who are numbered among the " friends of Russia " and, moreover, unable to speak Russian. Tourists are hindered from moving freely about the country, and still more so if they desire to study industrial conditions to any degree of detail. Consequently, the opportunity of collecting information on the spot is excluded.

Finally, let us consider what is written in No. 4 on page one of the official publication, *Sovietskaya Zolotopromyshlennost*: " Behind the high figures of wholesale production, as Comrade Mezhlauk¹ has demonstrated before a meeting of active Communists, is concealed an utterly disgraceful state of affairs which proves, in effect, that they are nothing but deception practised against the State. For example, the 100 per cent. fulfilment of the programme by *Glavstankoinstrument*² merely denotes in actual fact a striking failure to fulfil the programme of production of the most essential plant."

If the Soviet Commissar himself accuses his own statistics of being false and exaggerated, they must obviously be accepted with much care, and subjected to critical examination.

Bearing all the foregoing reservations in mind, let us now turn to the official Soviet data. The following is an extract concerning heavy industry, raw materials and fuel, taken from the latest Soviet statistical information in *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitelstvo S.S.S.R.*, published in 1936. The 1937 edition has not yet appeared :—

¹ Mr. Valerii I. Mezhlauk was then head of all the heavy industry of the U.S.S.R., or, according to European definition, Minister of Industry.

² A department of industry comprising all machine construction plant in the U.S.S.R.

HEAVY INDUSTRY IN THE SOVIET UNION

OUTPUT OF THE CHIEF PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY

	Unit of Measurement	1913	1932	1933	1934	1935 ¹
Coal	1,000 tons	29,117	64,664	76,205	93,940	109,000
Anthracite ...	"	4,778	18,139	20,727	22,246	24,600
Bituminous coal	"	23,209	39,636	46,612	60,311	69,900
Brown coal ...	"	1,130	6,889	8,866	11,383	14,500
Coke ²	"	4,443	8,421	10,225	14,221	16,752
Iron ore	"	9,214	12,086	14,455	21,509	26,845
Manganese ore	"	1,245	832	1,021	1,821	2,385
Pig iron	"	4,216	6,161	7,110	10,428	12,489
Electric smelting	"	—	15.7	20.9	67.0	117.1
Steel	"	4,231	5,927	6,889	9,693	12,600
Rolled iron and steel	"	3,506	4,288	4,882	6,734	8,995
Rails for railways, tramways, mines	"	645	496	595	865	955
Girders and channel iron	"	273	130	122	242	—
Profile and Section iron and steel ³ ...	"	1,324	1,232	1,276	1,646	—
Sheet and roofing iron ³	"	817	641	650	893	1,252
High-quality rolled iron and steel ...	"	—	683	888	1,247	1,670
Steam Boilers...	1,000 sq metres	28.0	166.4	200.3	226.0	197.3
All prime movers ...	1,000 kw.	—	750.7	1,529.5	1,294.7	2,264.0
Steam turbines ...	"	5.9	239.0	634.5	363.8	672.4 ⁴
Water turbines ...	"	—	59.5	52.9	74.6	52.0
Steam engines	1,000 h.p.	—	31.6	28.5	31.7	38.7
Traction engines ...	"	—	35.5	26.9	21.3	51.0
Diesel engines	"	35.1	95.8	92.4	131.4	158.0
Other internal combustion engines ...	"	—	451.8	996.0	1,008.4	1,843.2
Dynamos ...	1,000 kw.	—	1,164.3	736.5	678.4	732.5
Dynamos for steam turbines ...	"	—	826.0	385.0	335.0	425.5
Dynamos for water turbines ...	"	—	259.0	201.5	131.0	46.9

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

April—July, 1938

	Unit of Measurement	1913	1932	1933	1934	1935 ¹
Machines and motors with continuous and alter- nating cur- rent	1,000 kw.	—	2,036.1	1,773.4	1,871.9	2,250.0
Power trans- formers ...	1,000 kva.	96.3	3,426.0	3,330.0	2,874.0	3,461.3
Those over 1,800 kw....	"	—	1,997.4	1,821.0	1,689.2	1,815.3
Metal - cutting machines ...	Units	—	18,124	18,612	21,131	—
Forging and swage ham- mers	"	—	203	269	385	—
Electric welding machines and apparat- us	"	—	7,803	7,514	6,603	8,872
Rolling mill equipment	Tons	—	3,657	6,505	8,455	21,790
Electric fur- naces ...	Units	—	94	85	88	90
Heavy slotting machines ...	"	—	244	360	362	423
Pneumatic hammers ...	"	—	6,296	6,054	9,578	8,726
Frame sawing machines ...	"	—	134	354	348	397
Weaving looms	"	—	300	1,928	2,118	3,687
Knitting machines ..	"	—	1,806	2,555	2,761	—
Locomotives ⁵ ...	"	664	942	1,014	1,326	1,788
Locomotives for main- line goods trains ...	"	—	679	748	942	1,146
for main-line passenger trains ...	"	—	148	182	223	372
Locomotives : narrow gauge, with- out tender	Units	—	115	84	161	270
Main-line elec- trical loco- motives ...	"	—	1	17	19	34
Factory elec- trical loco- motives ...	"	—	135	298	191	228
Goods trucks (in two- axle units ⁶	"	14,832	23,111	21,614	33,513	90,758

HEAVY INDUSTRY IN THE SOVIET UNION

	Unit of Measurement	1913	1932	1933	1934	1935 ¹
Main-line goods trucks ...	„	—	20,152	18,126	28,957	85,675
Main-line passenger carriages ...	„	—	2,135	2,548	2,980	1,774
Automobiles ...	„	—	23,879	49,724	72,472	96,620
Lorries ...	„	—	23,845	39,465	55,362	77,666
Cars ...	„	—	34	10,259	17,110	18,954
Tractors ...	„	—	50,640	78,138	94,452	113,566
Tractor ploughs (expressed in terms of a standard plough body) ...	1,000 h.p. ⁷ 1,000 plough bodies	—	755.5	1,220.0	1,751.9	2,325.7
Tractor seed drills ...	Units	—	19,187	11,868	12,098	17,715
Combine harvesters ...	„	—	10,006	8,578	8,239	20,169
Excavators ...	„	—	85	116	276	452
Travelling electrical cranes ...	„	—	460	518	312	354
Conveyor plant ...	„	—	3,071	2,331	2,444	—
Belt-driven steam pumps ...	„	—	34,684	28,734	39,843	—
Compressors ...	„	—	561	962	1,794	—
Timber ...	Million cubic meters	—	164.7	173.3	181.3	203.2
—for building ...	„	—	99.4	98.0	99.7	112.9
—for fuel ¹³ ...	„	—	65.3	75.3	81.6	90.3
Sawn timber ...	1,000 cubic meters	11,875	24,427	27,334	30,579	34,000

NOTES APPENDED TO THE TABLE

It will be noticed that in the following list there is a gap in the numbering between 7 and 13. The reason for the gap is that the notes indicated by the intervening numbers were not required for this article.

¹ Preliminary data.

² Based on coke having 6 per cent. moisture content.

³ Excluding high quality rolled iron and steel.

⁴ Excluding those turbines completed in 1935 but which were products of previous years.

⁵ Including factory and narrow-gauge locomotives.

⁶ Including factory and narrow-gauge trucks.

⁷ Draw-bar pull.

¹³ Prior to 1932, the production of the saw-mill departments, auxiliary to industrial undertakings, was calculated. (These figures were included in the total of timber production.—EDITOR.)

In the above table, three characteristics strike the eye :—

(1) The inaccuracy of the figures relating to 1913, which can easily be verified by referring to Russian pre-War statistical publications.

(2) The arbitrary definition of various units, as, for example : tractor ploughs in terms of a standard plough body, having a given number of shares ; goods trucks in two-axle units, including trucks for narrow-gauge lines and building requirements, etc.

(3) The repetition of identical data under different headings : for example, among internal combustion engines are included automobile and tractor engines, engines for combine harvesters, etc. ; steam boilers are enumerated separately from steam engines ; and so on.

It is evident, moreover, from No. 1 of the notes appended to the Table, that the data relating to 1935 are only preliminary, and the Soviet authorities themselves consider only those of 1932, 1933 and 1934 to be final.

In order to arrive at a correct understanding of the figures given in the Table, let us first take note of certain features of economic life in pre-War Russia and the U.S.S.R. Russian* statistics prior to the War showed that 83 per cent. of the population lived in the villages and only 17 per cent. in the towns. These proportions hold good in the U.S.S.R., as was shown by the last published Soviet census of the 17th December, 1926 (see p. 542, *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitelstvo S.S.S.R. of 1936*).

It must be remembered that before the War, Russia had no colonies and exported no industrial goods. All industries, except those producing raw materials for export (timber, oil, etc.), manufactured exclusively for the home market. They supplied the countryside with essential goods, and in return it not only gave the towns all the farm products which they needed but exported these products to an extent sufficient to meet the demands of the greater part of Europe.

* By "Russian" is meant "pre-war."

The changes affecting exports, which can be ascertained from outside the Soviet Union, and data obtainable from Soviet journals, papers and decrees, relating to the extent to which the needs of the population have been satisfied, will help us to make out something from the official Soviet figures; to "decode" them, in fact, as did Mezhlauk at the public gathering of active Communists, when he indicated where figures were true and where they were deceptive. First, let us try to discover the real condition of Soviet heavy industry, and railway transport, both of which reveal more clearly than anything else the economic life of so extensive a territory as the Soviet Union. We will deal in turn with each branch of industry as it exists during peace time, and will then consider the consequences which war would be likely to have upon them all.

FORESTRY AND TIMBER

In Russia, forestry is closely bound up with transport and heavy industry. Apart from the fact that all villages and a large proportion of the towns are heated by wood fuel, some of the locomotives, part of the river transport, and a number of factories also depend upon it. The famous Siberian sheet iron owed its high quality to the charcoal with the aid of which it was produced. Furthermore, timber is the most extensively used building material in Russia, and, for special constructions, particularly during war time, it is indispensable. In 1914 the State forestry department possessed 55,000,000 *desiatins*,* which was 48 per cent. of the whole forest area subject to the Forest Preservation Law. From this area in 1914 the State produced in round figures, 160,000,000 cubic meters of timber, and about an equal amount was produced by the other forest-owners; a total of about 320,000,000 cubic meters, all produced strictly in accordance with the Forest Preservation Law. Of this amount, about 5,500,000 tons (*i.e.*, about 10,000,000 cubic meters) were exported. The Soviet Government (see Table above) produced in 1934 a total

* 1 Dessiatin = 2.70 acres.

of 181,300,000 cubic meters and surmised that the production in 1935 would be 203,200,000 cubic meters. Of the former quantity, 6,494,376 tons were exported, and it was surmised that the export for 1935 would be 6,775,354 tons (see p. 683), that is to say, with an output of timber reduced by half, its export was increased by over 20 per cent. This shows that the Soviet Government, in its pursuit of foreign valuta, exported not a surplus, but everything which could be sold abroad. Furthermore, during twenty years of its existence, the Soviet Government has cut down easily accessible timber, wholly neglecting to observe proper forest practice. Hence the production of serviceable building timber and of fuel will become progressively more difficult. The effect of such a policy was noticeable in the foreign market in the lowering of the price per standard of Soviet timber from 1930 to 1936 by almost a half (pp. 682-3, *Sots. Str. S.S.S.R.*, 1936).

Thus it will be seen that Soviet timber production, in spite of the employment of forced labour, failed to attain even two-thirds of that of 1914, when it was almost wholly utilised within the country; for only 3 per cent. of the total production was then exported. The uneconomic cutting down of timber in parts where it is easily accessible, particularly along navigable rivers and along railways, not only rendered the subsequent exploitation of the forests more difficult, but caused silting along navigable waterways such as the Dniepr and the Volga. Should there be an outbreak of hostilities in the West, the effects of such mismanagement would at once seriously impair the defensive capacity of the country. The present squandering of timber within easiest reach has already created difficulties for industry even in Siberia, where the gold mines (see *Sovietskaya Zolotopromyshlennost*, 1937) have been forced to reduce their output because of the lengthy distances along which wood fuel and pit props have to be transported.

COAL

The annual quantity of bituminous coal extracted in Russia before the War was 34,000,000 tons, and not 23,209,000 tons,

as is stated incorrectly in *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitelstvo S.S.S.R.* (see Table on p. 57 in *Russia: Her Economic Past and Future*, by Dr. I. M. Goldstein; New York, 1919).

The Donets basin alone yielded annually 23,000,000 tons of bituminous coal and 4,775,000 tons of anthracite. Brown coal was of little importance in Russia because it was practically useless for metallurgical requirements, and was almost entirely consumed directly as fuel at the pit mouth, for, if transport costs were to be added, it could not compete with other kinds of fuel. As shown in the Table, it was obtained near Moscow, Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), and Cheliabinsk, at the rate of 1,130,000 tons yearly. The quantity of coal planned by the Soviet Government to be mined in 1935 was not actually obtained, as we now know from the Soviet periodical press. For this reason we are able to accept as correct only the figures for 1934. According to these figures, 60,311,000 tons of bituminous coal were obtained in 1934, as compared with 34,000,000 tons in 1913; 22,246,000 tons of anthracite in 1934, as compared with 4,778,000 tons in 1913; and 11,383,000 tons of brown coal in 1934, as compared with 1,130,000 tons in 1913.

Excluding brown coal we arrive at the total quantity of 82,557,000 tons of bituminous and anthracite coal extracted in the Soviet Union in 1934, compared with 38,778,000 tons in 1913. Thus, twice as much coal was obtained annually as was mined before the War. It is possible that the rate of increase in the quantity of anthracite mined was greater than in pre-War days, but it is far more likely that, in keeping with the peculiarities of Soviet statistics, part of the bituminous coal was simply included under the heading of "Anthracite." The figures also show that other commodities, the production of which approximately doubled between 1913 and 1934, were iron ore, pig iron, steel, and rolled iron and steel.

If, however, we examine the Soviet periodical press, and the technical publications in particular, we will see that the

quality of the coal has been lowered proportionally to the increased quantity of it mined. The Stakhanov policy, and that known as *vydvizhenstvo* which preceded it, stimulated production at the expense of quality. Having been encouraged to increase output, the management of the various undertakings conceal the inferior quality of raw materials and manufactured products, both of which are often so bad as to be useless, in order to make their output look large on paper, and sometimes, as is evident from Mezhlauk's statement, quoted previously, they give "cooked" or simply false information.

After examining the latest examples of Soviet locomotives of the F.D. and I.S. types, which were shown at the Paris Exhibition, it is possible to estimate an average figure, indicative of the fall in quality of Soviet coal compared with pre-War Russian coal. According to the Soviet authorities themselves, the fire-boxes of these locomotives are adapted to burn low-grade coal. Bearing in mind that the total weight of each locomotive is 240 tons, the axial loading is 20 tons, and that, again, according to the statement of the Soviet authorities (obviously false, but in addition superfluous, in view of the bad condition of the tracks), the speed-limit of the locomotive I.S. is 145 kilometers per hour, we may conclude that both types of locomotive are intended for main lines. Low grades of coal therefore appear to be commonly used in the Soviet Union, for they are not only employed on main lines, but, for lack of anything better, by the best makes of locomotive. Russian coals, especially those from the Donets, which constitute about 80 per cent. of the total quantity mined, were formerly of higher quality than the Polish. Now, after comparing the Soviet and Polish locomotives, which were exhibited in Paris, we note that for heating 295.1 square meters of heating surface, accompanied by a pressure of 15 atmospheres, the grate area of a Soviet locomotive is 7.04 square meters, whereas that of the Polish, of the *Pacific* type, is 3.36 square meters, with a

heating surface of 269.2 square meters, and a pressure of 18 atmospheres. Thus 2.23 times more Soviet coal than Polish needs to be burnt, in order to obtain equivalent results. This instructive comparison, which any visitor to the Exhibition could have made for himself, fully justifies the conclusion that the quantitative increase in Soviet coal output over the output in 1913, is nullified by the lowering of its quality. Consequently, a load of twice the former weight, yet containing the same calorific value as before, must now be transported. Here it may be remarked that the 11 million tons of brown coal mined in 1934, the calorific value of which is even lower than that of wood fuel, did not by any means compensate for the 80 million tons by which the 1934 output of timber fell short of that of 1913, and of which a minimum of 40 million tons would have been used as fuel.

From this brief survey we can see that during seventeen years of the Soviet régime the mining of bituminous coal, in terms of calories, has been effected with difficulty, whereas in 1913 it was effected with ease; and that if we leave out of account the increased consumption of fuel by transport, which, as we shall see in a later article, has actually increased by more than three times, the population has been deprived of at least 30 million tons of wood fuel. Repeated confirmation of this conclusion is to be found in the general Soviet press, where it is pointed out that, owing to the lack of fuel, the population is exposed to freezing conditions, and that, during winter, schools are often closed down because there is no fuel to heat them.

THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY

As may be seen in the Table, the quantity of iron ore mined in 1934 was 21,509,000 tons; that of pig iron smelted was 10,428,000 tons; steel produced (including iron), 9,693,000 tons; and its rolled products, 6,734,000 tons. These figures are, on the average, double those of 1913, but the difference becomes reduced when we compare ore outputs with those of rolled iron and steel. The ratio of ore production in 1934 to

that in 1913 is as $21.509 : 9.214 = 2.32$; that of steel, $9.693 : 4.231 = 2.28$; and rolled metal, $6.734 : 3.506 = 1.91$. When we consider next the separate items within the category of rolled metal, we observe that the ratio of their totals, $3.646 : 3.059$, is equal to 1.18 , and that the ratios of the following component items are: rails, $865 : 645 = 1.34$; girders, etc., $242 : 273 = 0.89$; profiled and section iron and steel, $1.646 : 1.324 = 1.24$; sheet and roofing iron, $893 : 817 = 1.09$. The average increase in the output of these four fundamental products of heavy industry was therefore 18 per cent. during the period between 1913 and 1934 inclusive. The Soviet authorities stated that 1,247,000 tons was the output of "high quality rolled metal," adding in Note 3 that this was not included under the heading of sheet and roofing iron; but such a distinction was not made in 1913. The explanation is that the 1913 figures did not include shoddy output, for all the metallurgical factories were private and, in addition, were consumers; shoddy products were, therefore, not accepted. The Soviet government, being simultaneously both consumer and producer, puts into circulation all shoddy products, which, according to the Soviet periodical press, in some branches of the industry amount to 90 per cent., and are referred to as "second quality" products; hence the term "high quality" has been invented for application to products of competent workmanship, which, according to European definition, can only mean "satisfactory," and corresponds to the former Russian technical standards. The 1,247,000 tons of actually serviceable rolled metal is 1.72 times less than the 2,141,000 tons of profile and sheet iron and steel manufactured in 1913.

On page 133 of *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R.* for 1936, are to be found various details which supplement the Table contained in the same publication and summarised in this article. On this page it is shown that the quantity of strip iron, wire, and iron tubing was 347,300 tons in 1913 and 944,700 tons in 1934. Bearing these figures in mind, we notice that rolled iron and steel products in 1913, distributed between

their various categories, are almost wholly accounted for, whereas, in 1934, 896,300 are unaccounted for, and it is not known exactly what they represent. A partial explanation may be found on page 135 of the Annual just referred to. Here, all rolled iron and steel products have been divided into two categories: rolled metal products prepared for release, and rolled metal products not prepared for release. A note on the same page gives this explanation: "The category 'products prepared for release,' means products delivered by some factories to others for further treatment in rolling mills." Thus, rolled metal "products for release" appears twice in statistical data: the first time after preliminary rolling, "for delivery to another factory," and the second, after the release of the finished product by the second factory. On page 135 it is also stated that in 1934 there were manufactured for further treatment: 5,486,000 tons of medium-quality and 1,247,700 tons of high-quality rolled metal; not intended for further treatment: 4,990,200 tons of medium-quality and 1,198,400 tons of high-quality rolled metal. According to this table, therefore, in 1934 the quantity of rolled metal not intended for further treatment, that is to say, actually ready for use, was 6,188,600 tons, of which the amount of "high-quality," or truly serviceable, according to normal technical standards, was 1,198,400 tons. Detailed tables in the 1936 Annual end at 1934, which confirms its statement that the figures for 1935 are provisional. Yet even those figures in the detailed tables are lower than the totals in the large general Table, summarised in this article: for example, 6,188,600 tons compared with 6,734,000 tons, and 1,198,400 tons compared with 1,247,000 tons; and as stated above, the detailed table on page 133 gives a figure of 896,300 tons less than the total in the general Table.

Similar disharmonies reveal themselves repeatedly in this Soviet annual. Note 1, on page 415, concerning the statistics of railway transport, declares that: "In some instances, owing to causes of a technical nature, component figures, when added

up, do not agree with the totals given." Reading this statement, one involuntarily recalls the official words of Mezhlauk, the Commissar of Heavy Industry, quoted at the beginning of this article, to the effect that high figures of production by Soviet industry are often nothing more than deception practised against the State. Yet even if we accept as true the Soviet figures quoted above, relating to heavy industry, we observe the same phenomenon as in the coal industry: while the quantity of ore increased by about the same extent as the quantity of coal mined, that is, by 2.32 times, the chief items, including the profile rolled iron which, as shown already, appears twice in statistics, and all shoddily-made goods, increased by 1.6 times, expressed by the ratio, $4.893 : 3.059 = 1.6$. If we make a deduction to allow for this repeated quantity of profile rolled iron, the ratio becomes $4.000 : 3.059 = 1.25$. But if the "high quality" portion of rolled metal output in 1934, which alone fulfils the former Russian technical standards, were alone taken into account, this ratio would be reversed. It would then become two and a half times less ($3.059 : 1.198 = 2.55$) in 1934 compared with 1913. Here, again, is evident both the influence of the Stakhanov methods, which encourage quantity, and the absence of a free market which demands quality.

Although the quantity of ore extracted was greater by 2.32 times, and that of iron and steel manufactured by 1.25 times, the Soviet authorities were not long ago compelled to place in America an order amounting to 50 million dollars for armour-plating and other parts of warships, and for heavy artillery, all of which, prior to the War, had been manufactured by Russian factories and were of first-class quality.

MACHINE CONSTRUCTION

In this section we must restrict ourselves to a general survey of machine construction; for within the limits of the space available it is impossible to treat the subject in detail. For the sake of clearness, we will exclude discussion both of railway rolling stock, with which we will deal in a later article,

and automobiles, tractors, and other agricultural machinery, to which the next section is devoted.

The categories of machine construction in 1913, which are enumerated in the Annual and included in our table, are quite falsely presented. Among them is none relating to the manufacture of traction engines, excavators, steam engines, etc., whereas in actual fact the excavators and dredgers of the Putilov and Sormovo factories, the traction engines of the Maltsov factories, and a very varied selection of steam engines, built at the different Russian factories, satisfied the whole of the home market to the extent of 80 per cent., and in quality could compete with first-class European workmanship, for which reason they found a sale on the market, even in the absence of protective tariffs. The purpose of this article is only to make comparisons between Soviet and pre-War manufacture, when necessary for conclusions about Soviet achievements, and to pass judgments in regard to the capacity of Soviet industry and railways in the event of mobilisation for war. In this section such a comparison, save where it concerns the manufacture of railway rolling stock, is of no interest, though, it may be mentioned in passing, it would be far from favourable to the Soviet government.

The general Table in the Annual shows that the production of all prime-movers, including water turbines, was 1,294,700 kilowatts in 1934, and 1,529,500 kilowatts in 1933. A detailed table on page 154 of the Annual states that in 1934 automobile and tractor motors for combine harvesters, railway inspection motor trolleys, etc., accounted for 575,000 kilowatts. From this data we may conclude that for other requirements of industry, shipping, and aviation there remained a total of about 719,700 kilowatts, or, in round figures, 980,000 horse-power, and for engines burning light fuel (except automobiles and tractors), 28,500 h.p. This last figure, if it is correct, represented the maximum number of constructed aeroplane engines in 1934. If we presume their average power, such as that of the aeroplane ANT-25, to have been 1,000 h.p.,

then the number of them built in 1934 would have been 28 or 29 in all, and in 1933, 18 or 19. Deducting the power of marine and aeroplane engines from 980,000 h.p. we are left with a remainder of 849,300 h.p. or 630,000 kilowatts produced and utilised by the whole of industry. The Annual states that the total mechanical power which served Soviet industry in 1934 was 8,285,700 kilowatts (page XXXVII). The production of 630,000 kilowatts for the benefit of industry in 1934, a figure which constitutes 7.6 per cent. of the effective motive power of industry, is insufficient even to cover depreciation, for, according to the evidence given by foreign engineers who have been in the Soviet Union, and confirmed by the Soviet press itself, machinery of even the highest quality obtained from abroad, fails in the hands of Soviet workers to last not only 13 years (the time necessary for the annual maintenance at 7.6 per cent.) but even half that period. Hence, the conclusion is unavoidable that in the sphere of factory machine construction, the Soviet government is unable with its own efforts even to keep pace with the wear and tear of equipment, for which reason it is obliged to purchase it from abroad.

The first to suffer for this inefficiency is the population, which is unable to secure the manufactured goods it requires. For example, less than half the quantity of cotton textiles available as far back as 1900 are now obtainable. In 1900 there were produced for each inhabitant of Russia 34 meters of cotton textiles (see official publication of the Russian Ministry of Finance for the 1900 Paris Exhibition, *Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century*), whereas in 1936, according to the Soviet posters at the 1937 Paris Exhibition, the amount was 15.7 meters. There is still a similar shortage of manufactured goods for consumption in all branches of production, and the population cannot even buy products of essential necessity; partly because heavy industry is not in a position to supply light industry with the necessary equipment.

AUTOMOBILES, TRACTORS AND COMBINES

In 1934 the Soviet government manufactured 55,362 lorries, 17,100 cars, 94,452 tractors, and 8,239 combine harvesters. The quantities planned for 1935 were: 77,666 lorries, 18,954 cars, 113,566 tractors, and 20,169 combine harvesters.

If we turn to the general Table of Soviet production, at the beginning of this article, we shall see that, provided industry developed at the same rate as during the preceding three years, the quantities planned could in all instances be fulfilled, with the exception of combines, the production of which, during the same three years, was falling, and, judging by the figures, falling contrary to the desires of the Soviet authorities. It seems unlikely, therefore, that by the end of 1935 the number of combines could have been doubled.

If we were to accept all the figures of 1935 as correct, the total number of machines for transport and agriculture, which the Bolsheviks were able to build annually, was 230,355*

On page 247 of *Šotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R.* for 1936 are given the figures representing the total stock of equipment of Soviet agriculture (of *sovhozes*, and Machine Tractor Stations serving the *kolhozes*). According to these figures, the stock at the beginning of 1936 was constituted as follows: 326,300 tractors having a total horse-power of 5,710,200, that is to say, an average horse-power of 17.5 for each tractor; 43,100 lorries; 9,149 cars; and 49,400 combines. These figures included machines obtained from abroad. If we presume the average capacity of the lorries, combines and cars to have been even 20 h.p., we obtain, as the total capacity of mechanical farm equipment, $101,649 \times 20 + 5,710,200 = 7,743,180$ h.p. We know from the Soviet periodical press that half of the existing stock of this equipment was constantly undergoing repairs and that even at the beginning of the active period of work on the farm, not more than 70 per cent. of the machines listed in the inventory were fit for work in the fields. Even if it is presumed that all these machines were

* Under the designation "machines for transport and agriculture" are included: 96,620 lorries and motor cars, 113,566 tractors, and 20,169 combines.

in ideal condition, there would still have been only 7,743,180 h.p., while the total number of horses of all ages in the Soviet Union, including those in the Army, was 15,900,000 (page 354, *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo S.S.S.R.*, for 1936). In 1913 there were 34,973,000 horses in Russia without Finland (page 165, *Kalendar Suvorina na 1917 god.*), that is to say, 0.20 horse per inhabitant. This figure takes into account Poland and the border regions, now no longer part of Russia, where there was only 0.12 horse per inhabitant. With a population on January 1, 1933, according to *Sotsialisticheskoy Stroitelstvo* (p. 542), amounting to 165,748,400, and 0.20 horse per inhabitant, the total number of horses in the Soviet Union should have been $165,748,400 \times 0.20$, or not less than 33,149,680. The Soviet government has therefore given to agriculture, in place of the 17,249,680 (*i.e.*, 33,149,680 - 15,900,000) horses which it destroyed, a total of 7,743,180 indicated horse-power. Indicated horse-power is not equivalent to a live horse. With a one horse-power tractor, it would be impossible not only to plough but even to move; but one horse can both plough and haul a half-ton load over a bad Russian road, along which not even a motor-cycle can pass.

The Soviet government states, as we have already seen, that the number of machines of all kinds produced annually for transport and agriculture was 230,355, which, with an average capacity of 18 h.p., yielded 4,150,000 h.p. capable of substituting not more than 1,000,000 live horses (and not the 15 million to 16 million which were lacking); and then only if there were adequate roads. Such roads in the Soviet Union hardly exist, and moreover, during six months of the year they are covered by deep snow, along which the passage of motor vehicles is scarcely possible. Therefore, the substitution of machinery for the 17,000,000 horses whose destruction the Soviet authorities brought about, is, for practical purposes, a senseless undertaking in the U.S.S.R.

All this shows the absurdity of an attempt to provide a mechanical substitute for the horse in Russia, where there are

vast free spaces for the development of horse husbandry. Yet the Soviet government is making deliberate though unsuccessful efforts to do so. The reasons for them are political, not economic. Deprived of horses, the peasants are placed in a position of serf-like dependence. Those in the *kolhoz*, having no horses, are obliged to seek their requirements at the State-owned Machine Tractor Stations, which, at harvest time, are prompt to withhold that portion of the threshed grain, amounting to about 20 per cent., which is a taxation payment in kind to the State, and half of the remainder as a charge for their work: about 40 per cent of the whole crop. By this means, the Soviet Government has replaced tax collectors by machines, especially combines, which, after cutting and threshing the crop, give the peasant only 40 per cent. and keep the rest for the State. The character of tax-collection is thus inverted, and it is no longer necessary to obtain taxes from the peasants by direct means because it is not the tax-collector who demands taxes from the peasant, but the peasant, his share of the crop from those who have taken hold of it. This is the real explanation of the hatred for machines which has grown up among the peasants of the Soviet Union, and hence they seek to ruin machinery by every means.

In the sphere of mechanising agriculture, the Soviet government wages a hard struggle with the peasants. The combines, tractors, and automobiles become worn out and ruined in an unbelievably short time. For this reason, without bringing into question the figures relating to 1935, which the Soviet government itself declares to be provisional, we may state that the manufacture of both automobiles and agricultural machinery of all kinds, falls very far short of satisfying in quantity even the minimum needs of the population. We have been able to judge of the quality of production by this branch of Soviet industry at the Paris Exhibition, where examples were on view in the U.S.S.R. pavilion.

An engineer cannot fail to be struck by the design of the machines, which, according to the modern technical standards of Europe and America, is out of date by four or five years; and also the crude workmanship which the construction reveals. The radiator of a combine, set in motion before my eyes, boiled up after five minutes' work without a load. How would it work with a load? It is to be presumed that the machine chosen for exhibition was not the worst but rather the best example. Remarkable, too, was the warning stamped on a metal plate which was attached to the combine: "Before setting in motion, tighten up all nuts and stoppers." How must the machine have been assembled, if the manufacturer has to warn the operator to tighten up the nuts each time, in case some of them are shaken loose by vibration after a few hours' work!

The political strivings of the Soviet government to substitute machines for live horses have inflicted particular hardships in the matter of the country's food supply, an examination of which would be outside the province of this article. We shall discuss the consequences likely to attend such a policy in a future article.

EDITOR'S NOTE

A short time after the receipt of this article the Commissar for Heavy Industry, L. M. Kaganovitch, made an important pronouncement, which appeared in *Pravda* on January 3, 1938. This statement bears out in every way the arguments set forth by Mr. Makcheeff. According to M. Kaganovitch, the plan for 1937 was only fulfilled to the extent of 88.9 per cent.; and this figure no doubt includes a large proportion of defective articles. Special attention is drawn to the under-production in the following industries: non-ferrous metals, tubes and cement.

A great many reasons for failure are given: poor organisation of labour; want of discipline and technical knowledge; talk about the lowering of costs instead of a direct attack on over-expenditure and the tremendous wastage in production; the output of incompleated articles. The liquidation of wreckers, it is stated, is not yet satisfactory. [On the same page of this paper a correspondent reports that tractors at a large station are lying buried in snow. The sheds which should have been completed in 1932 remain unfinished.]

Prominent Soviet Fugitives

We publish below statements made by two former Soviet officials who recently held prominent positions, and who, finding themselves abroad, decided not to return to Soviet Russia. The first of these statements is the translation of an article in "Il Giornale d'Italia" of February 17, 1938, by Mr. F. Butenko, who fled from Bucarest, where he was Soviet Minister, and took refuge in Rome.

By F. BUTENKO

I

APPEALING to the lowest instincts of the peasants, Bolshevism promised them a redistribution of the land and rights of ownership. In reality, it introduced to the Russian countryside the most atrocious servitude known to history. By force of arms and by coercion of all kinds, including so-called administrative measures, the peasants were herded into collective farms. Thus, they were deprived of landownership and of all incentive to work. Thenceforth, they were conscripted into gangs, and forced to labour under the whip. At the same time they were compelled to give to the State all that they produced, receiving in return a meagre ration. In these circumstances, it was hopeless for them to think of developing any sort of life for themselves.

The workers were to become masters of the State. The Bolsheviks promised that they would give them possession of all the factories and workshops. Actually, the Russian workers never suffered such privations as those which they endured during the period of socialisation. A new bourgeoisie has replaced the former capitalists. It is composed almost entirely of Jews. Nearly all the capitalist Jews fled from Russia after the outbreak of the Revolution; the other Jews

who remained behind enjoy the protection of Stalin's most intimate counsellor, Lazarus Kaganovich, who is himself a Jew. All factories and workshops, all munition industries, all railways, all wholesale and retail organisations are virtually and effectively in the hands of the Jews. It is they who control the monopoly of production; only theoretically do the workers appear as "economic masters." The wives and families of the Jews possess luxurious villas and motor cars, spend the summer at the seaside resorts of the Crimea and the Caucasus, wear costly furs, ornaments, bracelets and rings, and have their dresses and other articles sent from Paris. The worker, fooled and deceived, receives a monthly wage of from 400 to 700 roubles. When it is borne in mind that a meal at a factory dining-room costs from six to eight roubles it will be realised that he leads a starving existence. Having done his day's work, he passes his time in one of the clubs which constitute the only real innovation created by the Bolsheviks. Up and down the country, they have established tens of thousands of these clubs in which they wage an intense Jewish communist propaganda, in the hope that it will cause the workers to forget their privations.

I have spoken with many workers who remember life as it was in old Russia. To them it is now a remote dreamland, for in those days their wages assured them sufficient food and decent clothing, whereas to-day they are compelled to wear the same suits from five to seven years, meat is a rare luxury, neither vodka nor beer are regularly procurable, and to crown all, it is necessary each day to pass several hours at meetings of committees and, whenever called upon, vote servilely in favour of the Bolshevik régime.

The Bolsheviks promised full liberty and autonomy to the nationalities of old Russia. They even declared that of their own free will these nationalities should have the right to leave the Soviet Federation. What really happened? Without speaking of the treatment accorded to other nationalities, I will deal only with the fate of the Ukrainians. In Ukraine,

all the chief posts in the administration and in important enterprises are occupied by Jews or faithful satellites of Stalin, expressly sent from Moscow. The chemical, aircraft and arms industries, the machine construction workshops and the electrical industries are all concentrated at Moscow, Leningrad, in the Urals, in Siberia, and the Far East. Industrially, Ukraine is a kind of Moscow colony. Its inhabitants, once so prosperous, are now reduced to a semi-permanent condition of poverty. Every manifestation of Ukrainian nationalism, no matter how small, is ruthlessly exterminated. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians, among them many patriots, conspicuous for their nobility and courage, have been imprisoned and a large number of them shot. Ukraine, oppressed and tortured, is in a continual state of siege, and is literally impregnated with hatred for the Bolsheviks. Similar conditions exist in Georgia, Armenia, White Russia, and amongst the races of Asiatic Russia.

The Bolsheviks would like the world to think that the Soviet régime is a model of ideal democracy. What ridiculous mockery! In Soviet Russia, not only is there no daily paper which is not Communist, but not a single paper which is without Party tendency. To be suspected of holding contrary views to those of Stalin is to be guilty of high treason, a crime punishable by execution or at least by long years of imprisonment.

If only for the fact that it stifles thought, not alone in politics but also in science, the régime which has been created in Russia is intolerable. Not long ago, the Bolsheviks imprisoned Professor Tupolev, the famous designer of aeroplanes, including those which flew across the North Pole to the United States. Yet he had devoted himself wholly and solely to his technical work, had served the Soviet régime honestly and well, and had never concerned himself with politics. Thousands of other scientists have suffered similar persecution, and thousands more will yet be condemned to undergo it. At the present time, blind terror reigns through-

out the Soviet Union. In its continual struggle with the multitude of contradictions which it has itself created, it has made the death penalty the key of its own internal policy. Thousands of officers of the Red army have been slaughtered, including such notable Soviet generals as Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Yakir, Gamarnik, and others. Dozens of the best diplomats have been put to death, presumably for no other reason than the suspicion that their continued stay abroad would cause them to become traitors to their government. Finally, a number of prominent Communist leaders have been exterminated. In no one of the instances alluded to was trial conducted in accordance with the juridical standards of the rest of the world. Always the accused farcically confessed that they were guilty of betraying the State and thus themselves signed their own condemnation. I, who have been present at many such trials in Soviet Russia, know better than anyone else how dreadful is the mechanism of human destruction which has extinguished so many innocent lives. Feeling that the Soviet régime was so flagrantly in conflict with my ideals, I decided, once and for all, to be done with Bolshevism which had so long weighed on me like a frightful nightmare. Having lived during 1917 and 1938 in Western Europe, I realised clearly the immeasurable depth into which Russia has fallen. I understood that it was impossible to temporise, impossible to remain in the power of that illusory socialism called Bolshevism which cheapens and sells its pretended ideals while transplanting throughout the whole world the rule of barbarism, war and mutual destruction.

After an experience of the Bolshevik revolution, lasting for twenty years, I am convinced that, applied to practical daily life, socialist ideology is ephemeral and false, and I have decided to pass into the world of true culture, civilisation and justice, and there consecrate all my powers to the defence of progress.

By GENERAL KRIVITSKY

II

General Krivitsky, the author of the following statement, (which appeared in the "Posledniya Novosti," March 4, 1938), was assistant to the Chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Red army from 1935 to 1937. During that time, by reason of his position, he was brought into close contact with the G.P.U. upon the subject of which he is therefore qualified to speak. When in France, in December, 1937, he decided to sever his connection with the Soviet régime and to remain abroad.

WHEN I was in Russia, I did not hear that Gorky, Kuibyshev and Menzhinsky had been murdered. Both Gorky and Menzhinsky had been seriously ill for a long time, and most probably both died natural deaths. In the Soviet Union, even those in high positions sometimes die from natural causes. But if Stalin still asserts that Gorky and Menzhinsky were poisoned, then I am bound to say that he was the only person who could have been interested in their removal from this world. In particular, Stalin would have benefited from the death of Gorky. During his last stay in the Soviet Union, Gorky took advantage of his friendship with Stalin to urge him to lessen the terror. As a consequence, in 1935 their relations became strained. Gorky openly condemned the second secret trial of Kamenev, who was falsely accused of making preparations for an attempt on the life of Stalin. The relations between Gorky and Stalin became so bad that Stalin would not allow Gorky to proceed to Paris for the purpose of attending the International Congress of Anti-Fascist Writers. Gorky very much wanted to fulfil this engagement. All foreign passports and visas had been prepared, and, under the supervision of Yagoda, a number of experienced people, having a good knowledge of foreign languages, had been

appointed to accompany Gorky and act as his "bodyguard." At the last moment instructions were received from Stalin's secretariat to the effect that the journey was not to be undertaken. Subsequently, Gorky several times raised the question of his being allowed to proceed abroad. His doctors considered that only outside Russia could be found the conditions necessary for his restoration to health. But Stalin obstinately refused to grant him permission to leave the Soviet Union. In responsible circles of the G.P.U. it was freely said that Stalin was ready to risk Gorky's life rather than permit him to go abroad. Stalin feared that once he crossed the frontier Gorky would turn against him. . . .

I emphasise that I do not think that Gorky and the others were poisoned, but in some very, very well-informed circles in Moscow, after Yezhov became chief of the G.P.U., there were persistent rumours that he and Stalin were removing dangerous political opponents by poisoning them. When I was last in Moscow in April and May of 1937, a very responsible official of the G.P.U. told me that Ordjondikidze had been poisoned. He died after making a very strong protest against the terror at a meeting of the Politbureau. Stalin always acts thus: he accuses his opponents falsely of that which he actually practises.

During the last ten years, Stalin has brought innumerable sorrows upon Russia. I do not speak of the incredibly brutal acts of the last year—of the shooting of Tukhachevsky and his friends, executions which beheaded the Red army. I will only speak here of one fact, known to me beyond all doubt. The results of the last census were not published because they would have revealed that in 1937 there were in the Soviet Union not a 170 million people, as was deduced in the agitational department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, but only 145 millions. Because of the senseless policy of collectivisation, the criminal war against the peasantry, for which Stalin alone must bear the responsibility, the Soviet Union lacked 30 million people. Now, when the ill conse-

quences of such a policy are apparent, he prepares to kill all his opponents in the Party, like Rykov and Bukharin, who struggled against collectivisation and foretold the inevitability of its failure. Such tactics, I repeat, are characteristic of Stalin. His present tyrannical methods of solving his difficulties are only preparing the country for still more bitter sufferings. He has completely disorganised industry. In Leningrad and Moscow, 75 per cent. of all directors and responsible leaders of industrial enterprises have been arrested. The Red army has been decapitated and brought to such a state that the commanders of the chief regions are wholly destitute of technical military knowledge. In a word, the Soviet Union has been reduced to ruin.

The Pamirs¹

MOST of us have at one time or another planned in our imaginations a journey to Central Asia, to those places which would satisfy the desires of every traveller. There, for ourselves, we can trace history from its earliest days, and reconstruct with some freedom the Kingdom of Prester John, or follow the movements of Subotāi Bahadur and Chepe Noyon, the daring lieutenants of Jenghiz Khan. And, what is more, the very names of Tashkent, Bokhara, Samarkand, conjure up in our thoughts all that is mysterious and romantic about the East.

To these places we might well add the Pamirs (or, according to the old Persian, *Pai-mir*, which means "the foot of mountain peaks"), a remote inaccessible stretch of country characterised by vast expanses of grassy uplands, sprinkled with stony outcrops and bounded by snow-capped mountains. It was some thirteen centuries ago that Hsüan T'ang, the Chinese pilgrim, travelled across the Pamirs. He has left us a remarkable account of his journey.

The tragedy is that, for several decades, European travellers in those parts have been viewed with the gravest suspicion; even those who had the good fortune to obtain permission from the Tsars were closely followed, and subjected to frequent searches. Since the days of the October Revolution little news, except from official sources, has reached the outside world of the life led by the nomadic tribes living on the southern frontiers of U.S.S.R. To what extent have these peoples been affected by the Bolshevik régime?

We have at our disposal so many different accounts of industrial life in Russia that it is refreshing to read a genuine tale of travel, in which the author contents himself with giving us a story of his adventures among the Kirghiz² in a part of the world which has seldom been visited by English travellers. I was glad to find that there was no mention of Trotsky, or of Stalin for that matter; no statistics to show

the increase in the output of *kumyss* under the Five-Year Plan; no description of G.P.U. agents in the Kirghiz Republic.

It is not until the end of his story that Ivan Solonevitch allows us to know why he was so anxious to undertake this journey to those remote, sparsely-populated provinces. With his son as a companion, the author, who earned his living in the Soviet Union as a journalist and an organiser of athletic clubs, set off to the Kirghiz Republic with one object in view—to prepare the way for their ultimate escape from the Soviet Union by reconnoitring the ground, and making contact with the local inhabitants. Like many other Soviet citizens, the Solonevitch family desired to leave their country and to tell the world the true version of the Communist story. Later they discovered, thanks to a professor, that escape from this quarter was likely to prove fatal, and this man may well be considered to have saved their lives.

* * * *

It would be superfluous in this review to give details of the early stages of the journey from Moscow as far as Pishpek, although it is hard to refrain from quoting passages from the vivid and witty descriptions of Soviet life. Of Pishpek, the reader will be left with a few clear impressions: the hotel, with its rows of sleeping figures huddled close together, and its abounding bugs; the mud huts sprawling around the one modern building, which was, of course, the home of the local G.P.U.; the shops, virtually empty but for an abundant supply of vodka; and finally, as coercive collectivisation was imminent, the Kirghiz peasants, selling their sheep in great haste.

From here the party, in the company of Comrade Parkhomenko, a Bolshevik with an excellent revolutionary record, set off by lorry for Katchkorka, a gigantic State farm of 300,000 hectares.³ The journey was accomplished in the inevitable Ford lorry, heavily overloaded with goods, and crawling with human beings. The road lay across bare, arid country, where the only colour came from the steppe poppies,

like splashes of blood. These poppies, according to the author, are not without their use, for they are despatched across the frontier, where no customs exist, and furnish the Chinese with a steady supply of opium. The small villages, nestling in the valley of the river Tchu, were empty, for the inhabitants had taken the precaution of moving into Chinese territory.

Misha, the driver, deserves a special mention. He was the servant of the Transport Union Co-operative, and his masters provided him with neither food nor pay: they reasoned, very logically, that a chauffeur must be an intelligent person and therefore left the question of money to the initiative of the driver himself. Misha, and his confederates, would carry on the lorry kerosene and "surplus" petrol, which would fetch a very high price among the tribesmen. He was, however, as he himself boasted, an honest thief and always kept sufficient petrol for his machine.

By the second evening the party arrived at the "capital" of the Katchkorka State Farm, from where Parkhomenko ruled his domain. Now this Party man, who had been successively a sailor, a thief and a *chekist*,⁴ had no knowledge of sheep-rearing, the only industry of his territory; but on the other hand he possessed an excellent qualification—he had been a *chekist*. In the words of the author, he merely had to walk round the "capital," and with his experience he could scent any whiff of counter-revolutionary intrigue coming from the clerks, the Kirghiz, the sheep or the camels. After spending several days in his company, Solonevitch decided that although the methods of this blustering Bolshevik were typical of a *chekist*, he was probably as successful a ruler as you could find. As an example, let me quote one incident:—

"We were taken to see how the shearing was progressing. Inside a mud building, a number of Kirghiz were removing with remarkable dexterity the wool from a herd of sheep. The ewes were left with tufts of wool on their bellies to give them some protection against the cold nights. The eye of the *chekist* immediately spotted these tufts.

" 'There you have rogues. Sabotage!' he whispered to me.

'The best wool they leave on the sheep, the scoundrels. Who is in charge here?'

"From among the sheep and fleeces there appeared a short-sighted old Kirghiz.

" 'Why have you not sheared them properly? You are engaged in sabotage—you *kulak*! Shear them all, you son of a dog, or I will put you against the wall.' "

The effect was instantaneous. The sheep were clipped to the last hair. Within two days, some 500 of them had succumbed to the cold.

One evening Parkhomenko decided, for some reason or other, to deliver a lecture in the school on the progress of industry in the Kirghiz Republic. According to plan, he mounted the platform and started to read a paper on "Industrialisation, Tractorisation and Collectivisation," a subject which, it must be admitted, would be dull for an audience of schoolchildren of any nationality. In this case it was perhaps fortunate that the lecturer spoke in Russian, and that no one present could understand a word of any language but his own Kirghiz. In general, everyone appeared contented. At the conclusion of the speech, a man entered and the following conversation took place:—

" 'Are you the director?' asked the newcomer boldly.

" 'Yes, I am,' Parkhomenko condescendingly replied.

" 'Now tell me, director—you see, I am a Kirghiz and am not educated—you are a director and you are learned. Why do my sheep not die and yours do?'

"The reply contained more figures than convictions. The Kirghiz listened impatiently.

" 'Ha! Director. They have taken from the Kirghiz their sheep. They have taken them for themselves. Now the Kirghiz have no sheep.'

"With that he thrust on his cap and marched out. Parkhomenko turned to me and said: 'There's a villain for you!'

* * * *

The route of the expedition next lay in the direction of the Pamirs, to the small village of Djelai, situated some 200 miles to the south of Katchkorka but still within the jurisdiction of Comrade Parkhomenko. Although there was no

road, it was decided to make the journey in the Ford car, thus demonstrating to the tribesmen the progress in transport which had resulted from the Bolshevik régime. Misha was a born optimist and, in spite of bandits, the weather and the complete absence of any tracks, he brought the party safely to their destination. He drove, as only those who have sat behind a Soviet chauffeur will know—recklessly, without any trace of fear, tearing across the high stony plateau at the rate of fifty kilometers an hour.

Djelai, which lay beneath the range of snowy peaks, flanking the Pamirs, could boast of some dozen tents in all. The inhabitants turned out to a man to welcome the visitors, but sheer astonishment rendered them completely inarticulate: never in their lives had they seen a motor car or a picture of one (or any photographs, for that matter). Ultimately, there came forward a stout old man, Asbaev, who declared that he was the head of the local "Communist cell" and a long-standing member of the Party. Ivan Solonevitch here remarks that it seemed anomalous for a follower of Karl Marx, possessing a Party ticket, to have at the same time six wives.

The subsequent behaviour of Asbaev would surely have bewildered even more the Father of Communism. Inside his *yurta*⁵ the visitors were treated to a sumptuous repast, consisting of mutton in various forms and of *kumyss*,⁶ which is capable of devastating effects upon those who are not accustomed to it. Slaves on all fours waited upon the guests. During the meal, Asbaev, the old Communist veteran, would throw over his shoulder from time to time a half-chewed bone, which was instantly seized by one of the wives, who, with a shrill yell of delight, disappeared into a corner of the tent, where she devoured the succulent gift from her master. One wonders whether these traces of Trotskyism have since been liquidated.

To celebrate the visit, Asbaev organised a *baiga*: the local name for an Olympiad. Now every country has its own particular way of determining athletic prowess, physical strength or horsemanship. In Djelai, too, they had their own

method. Some 500 riders were drawn up abreast and in front of them, at a distance of 300 paces or so, was a solitary horseman who held on his lap a live sheep. The master of ceremonies, at a given moment, fired a shot from his gun and this was the signal for the 500 riders to charge full tilt ahead with the object of seizing the sheep from the lone horseman. After the lapse of a few seconds it was difficult for the spectators to make out what was happening, as horses were careering in all directions, people were shouting, others were fighting. Ultimately, a triumphant Kirghiz galloped up to the chieftain and majestically threw at his feet a "part worn" sheep. The victor was instantly presented with his prize—ten roubles and a bottle of vodka. It would be interesting to hear if other travellers in Central Asia have heard of a similar competition.

The next item on the programme was a wrestling match. The author, as a well-known wrestler, was asked to take on the local champion. Solonevitch found that his opponent's craft was reminiscent of the Stone Age, and was able to give him a valuable lesson in modern technique. But these events were merely a prelude to the evening feast, which the author is not likely to forget during his lifetime. Having partaken of several glasses of *kumyss* he relapsed into a heavy sleep, out of which he was rudely awakened by the sounds of firing and the barking of dogs. The *yurta* had been deserted. The camp was being raided by bandits, and was in an uproar.

"I threw myself to the side of the tent, where the rifles stood. They had gone. My only weapon was my camera. . . . Somebody stealthily stole into the tent and I aimed a blow at his head. Fortunately I missed, because I then recognised the voice of my wrestler friend. He was making frantic signs to me. . . . Grasping me by the hand, he pulled me after him in some direction or other. Outside the tent could be heard ever plainer the noise of firing coming from the bandits and the defenders. We crawled over the stones and through water until we came to a bush behind which were tethered two ponies already saddled and bridled. My friend leapt into the saddle and left me with no alternative but to do likewise. Together we galloped off into the night.

"I did not enjoy the ride, but how could my guide know that the man who defeated him in the wrestling ring had no idea how to ride? And how could one explain this fact when both ponies were flying over boulders, pits and bushes?"

It seems as though Solonevitch cut as poor a figure on a horse as John Gilpin. That he would sooner or later fall off was never in any doubt: the only question was whether it would be more prudent to slither voluntarily to the ground or to wait for the pony to do the trick. Eventually the animal decided the matter, but, to the astonishment of the rider, neither he nor his camera registered any bump or bruise.

When dawn broke the two made their way back to Djelai, or what remained of it—the marauders had left behind many traces of their raid. Presently Parkhomenko appeared safe and sound. (Perhaps he was acquainted with Treasure Island, for he had spent the night in a barrel.) After burying the dead, the remnants of the party bade farewell to Asbaev and set off thankfully on the return journey to Katchkorka.

* * * *

At Katchkorka, plans were made for the next stage of the journey. The idea was to return to Lake Issyk Kul, thence through Przhevalsky⁷ to the western side of the lake and then to travel by stages through Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan. Parkhomenko furnished the travellers with two letters of introduction to friends of his: one to the director of the State Opium Farm, managed by the G.P.U.; the other to the head of a large stud farm, also controlled by the G.P.U.

Lake Issyk Kul, or Tuz Kul (the Salt Lake), lies in a deep basin over 5,000 feet above sea-level. It extends 115 miles from east to west and is 38 miles in breadth. The waters are well known throughout those parts for their healing properties. Hsüan Tang, of whom mention has already been made, passed close to the shores of Issyk Kul during the course of his travels. At the present time, a steamer, *The Chekist*, travels across the lake, and on this boat Solonevitch and his son decided to sail. The boat on this occasion was heavily loaded; as the author later discovered, the cargo

was entirely composed of opium and arms destined for Chinese Turkestan.

On board *The Chekist* were some elderly Kirghiz, of whom young Solonevitch took a series of photographs. The Kirghiz were fascinated, and demanded that they should see the snapshots without delay. Thereupon Solonevitch was seized with a bright idea. Knowing that the old men had never in their lives seen a picture of themselves, he drew out of his pocket a photograph of a similar group, taken upon a previous occasion. The Kirghiz were enchanted, and only evinced some doubt when one of them noticed that in the picture he was mounted on a pony.

"But you surely have a pony?" asked Solonevitch.

"Oh, yes."

"Well, there he is in the picture."

The Kirghiz laughed, slapping their thighs with delight and insisted on paying for the photograph with an old bronze coin belonging to a former age.

Later that evening, after he had gone to sleep, Ivan Solonevitch was unexpectedly awakened by these same Kirghiz, who were brandishing revolvers and knives.

"Master, take the small boat and row to the shore," whispered one of them. "There will soon be a raid."

Without any further warning they slipped off into the rowing boat and pulled away from the ship. Before long the sound of shots and shouts broke the still night.

It was no light task to row eight or nine miles to the shore in a rough sea. Even when they had safely landed, the prospect was dismal, for there was no sign of human habitation: in addition, so hasty had been their flight that they had not taken with them any food supplies whatsoever. For two whole days they trudged along the shores of Issyk Kul and only on the evening of the second day, exhausted and famished, stumbled on a small camp, which fortunately did not belong to Kirghiz tribesmen; it was the seat of a botanical expedition from the Moscow Academy of Science.

In many of the more remote regions of the Soviet Union similar camps are sprinkled over the countryside. Apparently, exploration is a popular pastime among the professors. The authorities in Moscow have always been anxious to despatch expeditions far afield in the hope that they would discover new deposits of coal, or of gold and other rare metals. It was in this way that helium was found near Alma-Ata and that some of the riches of the Urals were discovered. The professors, for their part, welcome the opportunity of spending six months of the year far from the centre of political activity, and when they do return to Moscow, it is only to make out their reports and prepare the next trip. In Solonevitch's opinion, the great proportion of the discoveries never come to light. The professors believe that they are morally bound to conceal their discoveries from the Bolshevik power, and only to reveal them when a government, truly representative of the Russian people, has been set up in Moscow.

It has long been a source of wonder to me how you can ever tell in the Soviet Union whether a man is a G.P.U. agent or at heart a rebellious citizen. By what means, for example, did Marshal Tukhachevsky discover that certain of the generals were of his way of thinking? A similar problem faced Ivan Solonevitch when he was thrust *nolens volens* into the society of a professor and his colleagues:—

"Professor K. looked at me through his slit eyes and asked: 'How did you sleep, comrade tourist?'

" 'The State plan was exceeded by 1,000 per cent.,' I replied.

"We looked at one another and, as is so often the case among Soviet citizens, we understood each other by the ironical, though barely perceptible wrinkles in the corner of the eyes and the intonation of the word 'comrade.'"

The professor, all the same was more astute than to confide in a man without further investigation, and when Solonevitch had gone out one day, he searched every single article of his until he found an incriminating letter. Then, and only then, did they talk openly, and before parting, the botanist handed over a parcel to be delivered in Moscow.

Further description might well spoil for the reader a delightful book, which in all probability will be translated into English during the year. Ivan Solonevitch tells his tale with the skill and the charm of an experienced story-teller, and in the pages of his volume will be found not only a recital of adventure in distant parts of the Soviet Empire, but at the same time much about the life of the primitive peoples under the Bolshevik régime. The book has been written by one who has lived through revolution, famine and chaos, and has escaped to Europe to tell us his experiences.

NOTES

- ¹ *The Pamirs*, by IVAN SOLONEVITCH. A full list of books by the Solonevitch family is given in the Appendix to this article, together with the languages into which they have been translated.
- ² The name is derived from a legendary chieftain.
- ³ 1 hectare=2.4711 acres. This farm would, therefore, be considerably larger than England and Wales.
- ⁴ The *Chekists* were the Secret Police, later known as G.P.U.
- ⁵ The tent used in these parts; as a rule, mounted on a cart and drawn by a dozen oxen.
- ⁶ Milk first placed in leather bags, then fermented and beaten.
- ⁷ Named after the famous Polish explorer, who died in 1889.

APPENDIX

BOOKS WRITTEN BY MEMBERS OF THE SOLONEVITCH FAMILY

BY IVAN SOLONEVITCH :

Russia in Chains. (Has been, or is about to be translated into and published in English, German, French, Dutch, Italian, Japanese, Croatian, Spanish, Czech, Polish, Swedish, and Ukrainian.)

Pamirs. (Second edition.)

BY BORIS SOLONEVITCH :

Youth and the G.P.U. (Second edition in preparation. Translated into German and Swedish.)

BY TAMARA SOLONEVITCH :

Diary of a Soviet Guide. (Translated into German.)

BY YURII SOLONEVITCH :

A Tale About Twenty-Two Misfortunes.

Reviews of Books

Assignment in Utopia; by EUGENE LYONS; Harrap, 15s.

For once the lavish praise which reviewers have bestowed upon a book is fully justified. Mr. Eugene Lyons' book has deservedly been regarded as the best book written by a journalist on Russia in recent years. So full is it of passages worthy of quotation and of first-hand information that if it is to be reviewed adequately it should be dealt with at great length.

Unfortunately, space only permits us to refer here to one or two outstanding features of the work. The author went to Moscow in 1928 as chief correspondent of the United Press; he was then a communist. He left Moscow in 1933, by which time he had become convinced that Bolshevism was monstrously evil and catastrophically unsuccessful. An important circumstance worthy of note is that the personal experiences of the author agree wholly with the data which has for years past been produced by serious students of Soviet Russia, and disagrees wholly with the information given out abroad by the Soviet authorities and their foreign friends. That the observations of an honest investigator within Russia should accord with the results of patient research outside Russia, is proof that the truth about Russia can be established. It is clear, from what Mr. Lyons says, that the correspondents in Moscow knew quite well that the statements made in Professor V. Chernavin's notable book, *I Speak for the Silent : a Prisoner of the Soviet*, were perfectly true. They knew that sadism was organised by the G.P.U. and practised to extract confessions, denunciations, and, at one time, gold from Soviet citizens, that forced labour was used for cutting down timber

and for other public works, that millions of people lost their lives in the famine in Ukraine in 1932-33, that hundreds of thousands of peasants, stigmatised as *kulaks*, were killed or exiled, that the shooting of batches of men and women and even children went on continuously, and that living conditions were filthy and squalid. They knew, too, that the Five-Year Plan had failed to give the people even those common necessities easily obtainable in capitalist countries. But they were silent about all these things. So optimistically, in fact, did they write of the situation in the Soviet Union that, according to Mr. Knickerbocker, as early as 1931, the great industrialists and bankers of Europe were convinced of the ultimate success of the Five-Year Plan.

Mr. Lyons' book is as much an indictment of the press as it is of Soviet Russia. In their dispatches, the correspondents wilfully and persistently lied. They did so because no other course was open to them, if they were to remain in Moscow. Had they failed to keep on good terms with the Soviet Government they would have been expelled. They did not want to lose their jobs. In Russia, amid general squalor, they lived well, mixed with the ruling class and enjoyed innumerable privileges. Their employers looked to them to maintain friendly relations with the authorities, for, in the event of a correspondent being required to leave the country, his newspaper would suffer and others would gain. Hence, many important events, including the great famine, were not reported from Moscow; the existence of famine was even denied by the correspondents to oblige the Soviet Government. No wonder Mr. Lyons makes a comparison which is not so hard upon journalists as it is upon the oldest profession in the world.

While in Russia, many well-known correspondents wrote books, either extolling Bolshevism or with a bias towards it.

Such books had a great sale on the "pro" market. Then, on leaving Russia, some of them, with the material which they had gathered during their stay there, wrote books condemnatory of Bolshevism and "cashed in" on the "anti" market. A circumstance which should be widely known is that no journalist who writes a frank book about Russia is allowed to return and write a second one.

Mr. Lyons was not one of the cynics. He was, perhaps, a little slow in making up his mind to tell all he knew about Soviet Russia, but it must not be forgotten that he went to Moscow as a sincere communist pilgrim and it was not easy for him to change his views.

The mischief did not begin and end with dispatches from Moscow. Certain newspapers have from time to time published misleading information supplied to them direct by Soviet officials.

On November 8, 1937, for example, *The Financial Times* published an elaborate supplement emblazoned with the Hammer and Sickle, embellished with portraits of Lenin and Stalin, and containing articles by Soviet writers describing remarkable progress in the Soviet Union. Now, the chairman of *The Financial Times* is Lord Camrose, who, at the same time is chief editor of that national organ, *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Morning Post*. We cannot imagine this last-mentioned newspaper issuing a pro-Soviet supplement. Why one policy in "E.C.2" and another in "E.C.4"?

The working journalist has his livelihood to gain, and although he could do so by means more honest than sending false news, he makes no claim to saintliness. But the newspaper proprietor is in a different category. He should have the welfare of his country almost as near to his heart as his own. Certainly it is not in the national interests that the public should be misinformed about Russia.

L. A.

Russia in Chains; by IVAN SOLONEVICH; Williams & Norgate, 12s. 6d.

This book is one of a select few about Soviet Russia which will always be interesting to read, and which will provide material for history. In these respects it ranks with Professor Chernavin's work.

Russia in Chains has been translated into numerous languages, and it is inexplicable, when so many inferior works on Soviet Russia have appeared in our midst, that it should not have been published in English before. The author, a journalist, was in Russia during seventeen years of the Revolution and followed a great variety of occupations. Together with his son and his brother, a doctor, he ended up in a concentration camp, from whence he escaped to Finland. Thus he was a participator in many phases of Soviet life. Before speaking in more detail of his book, we desire to offer him sympathy in the recent loss of his wife and a young colleague under tragic circumstances. After escaping from Soviet Russia he started in Sofia a weekly newspaper, called *Goloss Rossii*, the policy of which was undisguisedly hostile to the Soviet régime. In this task he was assisted by his wife, Tamara Solonevich, whose book, *The Diary of a Soviet Guide*, was reviewed in the last issue of CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA. On February 3, 1938, an unknown messenger delivered a parcel containing a bomb to the flat where the Solonevich family lived. It was placed upon the table and shortly afterwards the bomb exploded, killing Mrs. Solonevich and a young man named Mihailov, who was on the staff of the newspaper. There is no doubt that this outrage was an act of revenge on the part of the G.P.U. Strangely, beyond a few lines in *The Times*, nothing was said about it in our daily press.

Mr. Solonevich takes readers to places where foreign visitors never penetrate, describes scenes such as Russians only can witness, and conversations such as only they can hear. In lines that are vivid, much solid information is to be found. The

author was engaged in statistical work in the concentration camps. He estimates the number of people incarcerated in them at not less than 5,000,000. Among them is the "flower of the nation." As is well known, the number of deaths is enormous; in the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal 100,000 prisoners lost their lives—and that is only one of many instances. Yet Mr. Solonevich makes the remarkable assertion that life outside the camps is not more hazardous and loathsome than life inside them.

A noteworthy feature of the book is the presentation of detail which enables the reader fully to understand what Mr. Solonevich terms "the technique of Soviet power." All independent minded men are in camps. The eyes and ears of the Government are "Activists," petty careerists, spies and denouncers, the first of whom was a little girl who informed upon her mother. For the masses, the régime has contempt. As far back as 1928, Manouilsky, later General Secretary of the *Comintern*, said scornfully to Solonevich: "What the devil do we care for the sympathy of the masses! We need the machinery of power; we shall get it, and we shall keep it! The sympathy of the masses! We spit on their sympathy!" Years later, a prominent Chekist declared to the author: "If we fail to reach our goal by a mere inch, the Socialist State will be discredited for ever. So there is no standing still. Ten millions more, twenty millions more—what of that!"

Mr. Solonevich insists that the primary aim of the Soviets is world-revolution, and adds: "Since hope for its speedy realisation must be postponed indefinitely, Soviet Russia has, perforce, been transformed into a psychological forcing-bed and military drill-ground in order to preserve the forces of revolution, its intricate organisation, its wealth of experience, and its army." But the masses are waiting for the day when they shall have revenge, and that day will be the day when war breaks out. Mr. Solonevich quotes the following sentence from an article by the former Red Commander, Trenin: ". . . no matter with whom the war were fought, nor what

military ruin were threatened—every bayonet and pitchfork which could possibly be stuck in the backs of the Red Army would certainly be driven home.” To this prediction Mr. Solonevich adds the following comments of his own :—

“ . . . Bolshevik military plans contemplate the possibilities of revolt both at home and abroad. To quote a high Red Commander : ‘ The question is, who would revolt first, our masses or those of our adversaries? In any event, the first revolt would break out in the rear of the side in retreat. Therefore, we must attack and we will attack.’ The results of the next war may well be world revolution. Foreign pacifists and idealists, striving to promote friendship with the Soviets at any price might heed this warning.”

The author was a prisoner of the G.P.U. and he tells from his own experience inside their prisons how, by wearisome examination, and threats to shoot relations, confessions are extracted. This statement is not new, but it affords valuable confirmation of others which have been made to the same effect.

So long as Mr. Solonevich keeps to descriptive reporting he is on a high level, but when he indulges in an argument with a Ukrainian professor in a concentration camp, he shows that, after all his experiences, he is still unaware of the causes that brought about Bolshevism, and with it the horrors of which he so bitterly complains. Although himself of White Russian nationality, he stands for the restoration of Great Russian domination under a centralised monarchical system. Consequently, he regards national movements as provincial, and jeers ignorantly at the Ukrainian language. The spirit that would inspire the régime which he would like to see established is evident from an article which he wrote in *Goloss Rossii* on January 11, 1938. In this article, he referred contemptuously to the Latvian Republic as “temporary,” declaring that it would be impossible to prevent Russia from renewing those centuries-old tendencies which had enabled her to defeat Sweden, and reach the shores of the Baltic. Arrogantly remarking that “a Governor in Riga will be appointed by us,”

he said: "We shall put before Ulmanis and his kind the choice between Paraguay and the Turukhansk region." It should be explained that many Russians have sought refuge in Paraguay, while the Turukhansk region was a region near the Arctic circle to which revolutionaries were sent in Tsarist times. It should also be mentioned that Dr. Karlis Ulmanis is the President and Prime Minister of Latvia. It is clear that if ever the nationalities in Russia succeed in overthrowing the Red Bolsheviks, they must at all costs prevent their territories from falling under the rule of the White Bolsheviks.

L. A.

Map of the Soviet Union; Funk and Wagnalls Company, 27a, Farrington Street, London; Map Bristol, 21S.; Paper, 12s. 6d.

Great inconvenience has hitherto been caused by the absence of a serious map of the Soviet Union with names rendered in English. As everyone knows, the political divisions of the Soviet Union are entirely different from those of Tsarist Russia, and numerous place-names have been and are still being changed. After the Revolution, names associated with the old régime were replaced by names of famous Bolsheviks. Later, as these Bolsheviks fell into disgrace, the names were changed again. Then numerous new towns and settlements have made their appearance, and new islands have been discovered, especially off the Arctic coast of Siberia, while explorations have revealed a number of territorial features hitherto undiscovered.

The map, which Messrs. Funk and Wagnall have produced, includes all the changes which had been made near to the time of printing, and fulfils in every respect the need so acutely felt for a really first-class map of the Soviet Union in English. It embraces not merely the Siberian Far East but the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, now to all intents and purposes, part of the Soviet Union, and those territories on the Asiatic mainland under the domination of Japan, together with

the changes recently made in them. Thus, the new map is as complete and as up to date as it is possible for any map to be. Nor is it likely to have a rival in the near future. We are told that its preparation occupied more than two years, and that the cost of its production was nearly £10,000. Printed in eight colours, it measures $4\frac{1}{2}$ by $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet, and contains thousands of names never before recorded in English on any map. Accompanying it is a useful handbook and index. The handbook gives a concise description of the chief geographical features of the Soviet Union, and mentions that it contains 185 nationalities, of which, after the Great Russian, the Ukrainian, composed of 32,000,000 inhabitants, is by far and away the largest.

The index comprises 10,000 names of cities, towns, workers' settlements, the chief villages, and even the main camps of native tribes. Space could not be found for all these names on the map, but each name omitted is preceded in the index by an asterisk, and followed by an indication which gives its approximate location to within half a square inch on the map. The two small racial maps of Europe and Asia, which are placed under the general map, are not good, at least as far as Russia is concerned. The various peoples are located and named to suit political views of a certain kind and the maps are therefore unscientific and unreliable.

Observation in Russia; by SIDNEY I. LUCK; Macmillan; 10s. 6d.

In the spring of 1936 a group of scientists left London for Siberia in order to observe the eclipse of the sun. With it travelled Mr. Luck, who was in the fortunate position of knowing Russia and speaking the language. In his book, he gives a day-to-day account of his experiences, of his conversations with peasants and fellow-scientists, of his adventures on the way from Omsk and on the return journey, and some general remarks upon the living and other conditions in the Soviet Union. In a number of respects the reviewer, who

is a regular visitor to Russia, finds himself in disagreement with Mr. Luck. Many visitors to Russia in the early part of 1936 were convinced that the reign of terror was over and that the Stalin Constitution marked the opening of a new era. Mr. Luck's account is interesting to read but there is nothing in it to suggest that he imagined that within a few weeks of his departure undisguised barbarism would again reign. Readers of this book would be well advised to read also *Assignment in Utopia*, by Eugene Lyons, or *Russia in Chains*, by Ivan Solonevich. A comparison between them and Mr. Luck's work is enlightening. It is one thing to observe an experiment incidental to a scientific outing, but it is quite another thing to be the object of it.

Dover-Nürnberg Return; by JOHN BAKER WHITE; Burrup, London; 5s.

France Revisited; by JOHN BAKER WHITE; The Economic League; 3d.

A quarterly publication like CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA suffers from the disadvantage of not being able to review books shortly after they appear unless they happen to be issued shortly before it appears. It is, for example, rather late in the day to take notice of Mr. Baker White's book, *Dover-Nürnberg Return*. Yet, even so, we feel compelled to do so, for it is a book which will last because it tells, with clarity and sincerity, the very things about Germany which everyone wants to know.

Although the author writes of Germany specifically, he refers to two matters of special interest to readers of CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA. After remarking upon the odd spectacle "of heavy guns drawn by big teams of horses and masses of cavalry," he says: ". . . the main training of the German Army to-day is for an Eastern and not for a Western campaign, and this must involve the employment of large numbers of horses which can live on the fields in a country where petrol vehicles are far from their supplies." It is interesting to

observe that, writing of the Red Army in No. 1 of CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA (October, 1936), General Golovine said: "Each cavalry division of the Red Army includes a special political detachment for carrying Soviet propaganda into enemy territory. Contrary to European example, the Red Army is expanding its cavalry and improving its equipment. This phenomenon significantly points to a preference for shock strategy."

A question frequently asked is: Does underground communism exist in Germany to a serious extent? Mr. Baker White estimates that, at the very outside, 20 per cent. of the population is in opposition to Hitler, although he adds that 10 per cent. of it would follow him in time of national crisis. He cannot, nor could anyone, say what proportion of this opposition is Communist, but he gives some new details regarding subterranean Communist activity in Germany, and incidentally mentions that "the West European Bureau of the Communist International, formerly in Berlin, is now in Paris, the international centre of the Friends of the Soviet Union in Amsterdam, and the League against Imperialism international secretariat in London, under the charge of a former senior official of the British Foreign Office."

France Revisited gives a temperate summing-up of the situation in France, much of which will come as news to the regular readers of our press. A valuable section is devoted to Communism in France. We are told that in 1937 the membership of the Communist Party of France amounted to 341,000, as compared with 288,483 in 1936, and 86,900 at the beginning of 1935; that the number of organised Party "cells" was 4,321 in 1935 and 12,922 in 1937; that the Communist parliamentary group has increased from ten to seventy-three deputies or eighty-two, if independent Communists are included; that the Party has forty-two subsidiary organisations and seventy newspapers and periodicals; and that it is conducting a vigorous propaganda in rural districts, and is well supplied with funds.

After pointing out that the Communist Party is continually stirring up strife in France, Mr. Baker White says : "One cannot escape the conclusion that the present difficulties of that country, the uncertainty and lack of confidence to be found in all circles, is due in no little degree to the tactics of the Communist Party."

Annali; R. Istituto Superiore Orientale di Napoli; Vol. IX, Fasc. II, III, IV; March-September, 1937, XV.

In this scholarly journal the articles which are of interest to readers of CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA are : (1) Rustaveli and his poem, "The Leopard Skin," of which thirty-one verses are translated. The love-theme which dominates, reminds one singularly of some of the mystical verses of St. Theresa of Avila, or even of our own Silurist, Vaughan. He remains the glory of Georgian poetry. (2) An interesting discussion on Koskenniemi, the Finnish poet and leader of cultural ideas in modern Finland. As a lover of Italy he receives high eulogies from Signor Salvini for his translations of Carducci into Finnish. (3) A sympathetic discussion of the work of Krachovsky, the Russian Arabic scholar tells us that his outstanding success has been the creation of a new branch of study devoted to modern Arabic literature. (4) There is also a study of the Bulgarian poet, Pencio Slaveikov, who, unlike the more popular national-political poet Vazov, seems to be more of a Keats—a poet of beauty, and one who is anxious to propound the theory that true nationalism is the nation's sincere surrender to the building-up of its own culture.

A. S. H.

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